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“The mark of a civilized man is the capacity to read a column of numbers and weep.”
---attributed to Bertrand Russell2
Introduction
Without a background in the Federal budget process, one might find many recent 
legislative choices truly inexplicable.  Why, for example, would the Congress enact a 
Medicare drug plan that provides to the same beneficiary, sequentially in the same year, 
first-dollar coverage, then no coverage, and then full coverage?3  Not for health or 
medical reasons.  Why would the Congress enact a tax bill that starts and stops tax rates 
multiple times within the same law and provides for the repeal of a provision in the first 
year after it is to be fully phased-in?4  Not for economic or business reasons.  
1 This work was supported (in part) by a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Investigator Award in Health Policy Research, for which I am grateful.  The views 
expressed herein imply no endorsement by the Robert Johnson Wood Johnson 
Foundation.  I am also grateful to those who gave me what were very helpful comments 
on an early draft of this paper presented at a Summer Workshop series at Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
2 DAVID G. MYERS, THE AMERICAN PARADOX: SPIRITUAL HUNGER IN AN AGE OF PLENTY
6 (2000), available at http://www.davidmyers.org/Brix?pageID=71.
3
 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.   
4
 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 
752.
Draft:  Do Not Quote, Cite, or Distribute
2
Unseen forces are at work.  Attempting to understand these laws without 
understanding the internal budget processes of the Congress will be as confusing as 
attempting psychoanalysis without a theory of the unconscious or attempting astronomy 
without a theory of gravity.  Only with an appreciation of the budget rules that the 
Congress has imposed on itself can an observer begin to see any basis for its choices. 
Unfortunately, “budget process” is both arcane and under-appreciated.  Since its 
initial enactment in 1974, its basic accounting measures have been amended to steer 
budgets to center stage and to reflect a public-choice-theory skepticism of government 
spending and deficits.  The procedures are not widely known and even less evaluated. But 
an explication of the budget process can demonstrate that it creates a systemic skewing of 
Congressional choices in legislation that has gone largely unnoted.   The policies that the 
Congress selects are directly dependent on the manner in which the questions to be voted 
on are framed, and the budget process has had much to do with this framing—and not in 
an even-handed way.  To a large extent, many legislative decisions are pre-ordained by 
their mode of Congressional consideration.5  With apologies to Marshall McLuhan, the 
process is the policy.6
Unquestionably, the budgetary aspects of a policy are a legitimate concern. As 
someone who cares deeply about individual entitlements to health programs and the 
adequacy of their benefits, I am very interested in the costs and funding of programs.  
5
 Garrett says that “the structure that lawmakers adopt will affect both the shape and the 
size of the budget.”  Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in 
the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 389-90 (1998).  That statement, 
while interesting and true, does not go far enough.  As discussed below, the substance of 
questions that are many levels of specificity below the “shape and size of the budget” are 
decided by the procedural structures chosen for the budget.
6 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1965) 
(“In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of 
control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in operational and practical 
fact, the medium is the message.”).
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Moreover, anyone who looks at the increasing size of the debt and the government 
resources that go to service it should be very, very troubled.7
But the budgetary structure and tools as they affect lawmaking are largely 
unanalyzed.  Until they are widely appreciated, they may often be random, inefficient, 
unrepresentative, and even deceptive.  Review, critique, and change are overdue in any 
case.
Such review is particularly needed now.  After a period of budget anarchy, the 
Congress has recently debated renewing its budget rules to make them central again to its 
decision-making process.  As this new era begins, we should develop an appreciation of 
what distortions the old rules have brought us and be alert to what we might anticipate 
from new ones.  
We should also consider additional structures to “counter-balance” both the 
skewing that results from the current rules and the sheer centrality of the budget in 
policymaking.   Simple realignments of ends and means would suffice in some instances, 
such as using budget structures to keep statutory promises rather than undermine them.  
But in a much more fundamental way, Congress should also review its simplistic focus 
on the restraint of monetary deficits alone.  In the long run, future generations may be 
equally or better served by the creation of budget-like restraints on non-monetary deficits, 
such as increased disability, diminished public health, or permanent environmental 
damage.  The once-and-future structures that have shaped financial decisions may offer 
solutions to these problems, too.  
7
 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2003), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4916/LongTermBudgetOutlook.pdf, for a 
projection that spending on the interest of the national debt is projected to outpace 
spending on Social Security in 2030 (under a high spending, low revenue scenario).  The 
Social Security Trust Fund is projected to be insolvent in the year 2042.  THE BOARD OF 
TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY 
INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/tr04.pdf.  
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This article is laid out in four parts.  Part One provides a brief historical 
background of the Congressional budget process.  Part Two consists of an explanation of 
four non-obvious concepts essential to understanding the basics of the once-and-future 
budget process.  Part Three is a series of observations of some serious effects of the 
process in lawmaking.  Part Four lays out suggestions for “counter-balancing” the budget 
process, including extending structures heretofore reserved for monetary deficits to 
remedy other intergenerational transfer problems.  In all parts, I have chosen illustrative 
examples generally from health policy simply because it is the substantive area of the law 
that I know best, but all areas of the law—from tax to criminal justice to education—have 
been affected by budget process at some point.   
It may also be appropriate at this point to say what this article is not. First, it is not 
a discussion of the intentional activities that are generally referred to as “gimmicks.”8  It 
is not an article about whether to balance the Federal budget or about the good or evil that 
deficit-spending can do for employment, inflation or the business cycle.  I also do not 
delve into the arguments about whether the budget is best balanced by reducing spending 
or increasing revenues.   Finally, I do not take sides in the discussions about whether 
statutory structures can balance budgets or whether a Constitutional amendment would be 
more successful.  
Whatever the outcome of these theoretical debates on budget goals (and their 
political parallels), the tools necessary to impose abstract limits on budgets do themselves 
produce important side-effects in lawmaking:  They subordinate policy and lawmaking to 
numbers in a variety of unexpected—and sometimes unacceptable—ways.  That is what 
this article is about.
Part One:  A Brief History of Congressional Budgeting9
8
 For example, if the Congress postpones an expenditure from the last day of a year to the 
first day of the next one, it may appear to achieve “savings” in the earlier year.
9
 For a more detailed history, see AARON B. WILDAVSKY & NAOMI CAIDEN, THE NEW 
POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (Pearson Longman 5th ed. 2004).
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For much of American history, a balanced Federal budget has been assumed to be 
the norm, violated only in times of war and emergency.10  The founding father of public 
choice theory,11 James M. Buchanan, goes so far as to characterize this norm as a “fiscal 
constitution,”12 governing government from the time of Adam Smith to that of John 
Maynard Keynes.13  But since World War II, this norm has been replaced by a general 
pattern of government spending in excess of government revenue and thus the creation of
annual deficits and a cumulative debt.14
Buchanan blames this squarely on the Keynesian theories that transmogrified 
economists’ views of deficit-spending from a sometimes necessary evil to a frequently 
needed tool for good.  By 1972, Nixon is quoted as saying that “we are all Keynesians 
10 ROBERT SAHR, National Debt in Billions of Current and Constant (2002) Dollars and 
as Percent of the National Economy, 1792 through 2002, in INFLATION CONVERSION 
FACTORS FOR DOLLARS 1665 TO ESTIMATED 2015, at
http://oregonstate.edu/Dept/pol_sci/fac/sahr/ntdt.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
11
 “Public choice theory is a branch of economics that developed from the study of 
taxation and public spending. It emerged in the fifties and received widespread public 
attention in 1986, when James Buchanan, one of its two leading architects (the other was 
his colleague Gordon Tullock), was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics.”  Jane S. 
Shaw, Public Choice Theory, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS ¶ 1 (David 
R. Henderson ed., 2002), at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoiceTheory.html (last visited May 24, 
2005).  “The term ‘public choice’ refers to a body of scholarship in economics and 
political science that tries to explain public policy as the outcome of rationally self-
interested behavior.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 133 
(2004).  
12
 “Before the Keynesian challenge, an effective ‘fiscal constitution’ did exist, even if this 
was not embodied in a written document. This ‘constitution’ included the precept for 
budget balance, and this rule served as an important constraint on the natural proclivities 
of politicians.” JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: 
THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (Academic Press 1977), reprinted in 8 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 32 (Liberty Fund 2000) [hereinafter, 
DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT], available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv8c3.html ¶ 8.3.17.  Buchanan also 
refers to it as the more colorful “Old Time Fiscal Religion.”  Id. at ch. 2.
13 Id. at 12. 
14
 Sahr, supra note 10.
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now,”15 and deficits became a semi-respectable way of government life.16  This was 
compounded with what the public-choice theorists identify as the tendency of 
consumers/voters to want to consume now and have someone else pay later and with the 
corollary tendency of self-interested politicians to help consumers do so by spending 
more than they tax.17  This, Buchanan claims, amounts to a conclusive diagnosis of a flaw 
in democratic politics as a system, a structural fiscal imbalance that rationalizes and 
perpetuates itself.18
At the time that Buchanan was making his diagnosis, the formal Congressional 
budget process had barely begun.  Prior to 1974, Congressional budgeting was something 
of an ad hoc activity.  While the New Deal and the Great Society had created programs 
with long-term financial commitments from the Federal Government, most spending was 
done through annual appropriations laws, each of which had a relatively narrow focus 
(e.g., defense in one bill, foreign affairs in another).  A full framework for considering 
revenues, spending, and relative priorities did not exist in the legislative branch.19
15
 David C. Barker & Stephanie T. Muraca, “We’re all Keynesians Now”?: 
Understanding Public Attitudes Toward the Federal Budget, 31 A M. POL. RES. 485, 485 
(2003) (“The first part of our title has been attributed to former president Richard Nixon, 
whose comment, to be fair, was a bit tongue in cheek—more a reflection of political 
reality as he saw it than an expression of commitment to progressive economic theory.”).
16
 It is, however, only “semi-respectable” because few want to acknowledge that it is 
done on purpose.  Cf. id. at 491 (“Although … some might consider the outcome of the 
so-called Reagan Revolution to exemplify Keynesian theory, the mere mention of the 
name Keynes is enough to send many a Republican intellectual into a prolonged diatribe.  
Certainly, budget deficits to the contrary, Republican rhetoric maintains an allegiance to 
budgetary thrift.”). 
17 DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 190 (“Politicians naturally want to spend 
and to avoid taxing.”).
18
 The actual symptoms that concerned Buchanan seem mild now.  “A two-year deficit of 
more than $100 billion” in fiscal years 1975-76 appears quaint in the current era in which 
the government runs a higher deficit each month.  DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 
12, at 51.
19
 Note that such a framework was imposed on the annual executive branch budget 
proposals by Congress 50 years earlier, but that the Congress continued its ad hoc 
response to the President’s budget.  Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 
20 (1921).
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In the early 1970s, however, a Constitutional showdown catalyzed a new budget 
law.  President Nixon asserted that the he had the Constitutional prerogative to refuse to 
spend appropriations that had been enacted into law.20  The Congress disagreed and 
passed legislation to delimit this authority, legislation that Nixon signed less than a month 
before resigning from office.  In addition to these highly visible limitations on the 
President’s authority to impound appropriated funds,21 this law, the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,22 (more commonly referred to simply as 
“the Budget Act”) provided the springboard for the creation of a deliberate and 
comprehensive Congressional budget process.    
At its outset, the Budget Act was a series of measures that were neutral about 
substantive areas of law and policy but that were expected to provide some transparency, 
order, and priority-setting to the Congress’s actions regarding revenues and spending.  
Despite massive changes in Federal funding, most of the basic elements of that law 
govern the process that is still used today.  It specified a budget schedule for each fiscal 
year, created a non-partisan budget review and analysis agency of the Congress (the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)), and created standing committees on the budget in 
both House and Senate. It contained definitions, specifications, and accounting rules.  
20
 In part, Nixon claimed this prerogative to keep the entire Federal budget below the now 
modest level of $250 billion.  It should also be noted that although he was the subject of 
the Constitutional fight, Nixon was not the first President to impound appropriated funds. 
See Item Veto Constitutional Amendment: Hearing on H.J. Res. 9 Before the House 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 95 (2000) 




 Impoundments like Nixon’s are not illegal.  The tools left to the President for dealing 
with already appropriated funds that he does not want to spend are deferrals and 
rescissions.  Deferrals are actions that effectively withhold or delay the expenditure of 
budget within the fiscal year that are either to provide for contingencies, achieve certain 
savings, or specifically provided by law.  2 U.S.C. §§ 682(1), 684(b) (2005).  Rescissions 
are permanent cancellations of budget authority for a given fiscal year.  To go into effect, 
the rescission must be approved by Congress within a prescribed 45 day period.  Id. at § 
683(b). 
22
 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C 
and 31 U.S.C.).
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While conflict existed over some types of spending and over committee jurisdictions,23
and while contemporary accounts made much of it,24 the Budget Act was generally a 
bookkeeping measure that was neutral about specific subject matter or budget policy. 
The public-choice budget-balancers were unimpressed:  
[T]here is nothing in the 1974 legislation, or in its subsequent institutional 
changes that imposes a norm for relating the two sides of the fiscal 
account, nothing that acts as a putative replacement for budget balance in 
the old-time or pre-Keynesian fiscal constitution.  After 1976, if the 
intentions of the Budget Reform Act are to be followed, Congress will be 
somewhat more explicit in the creation of budget deficits.  Such 
explicitness may reduce somewhat the size of the deficits, although the 
possibility that deficits could become larger cannot be ruled out.  
Regardless of particular direction, however, it seems beyond the limits of 
plausibility to suggest that explicitness alone will literally transform the 
behavior of modern politicians.25
Subsequent amendments to the Act were not so impartial about fiscal policy and 
substantive program content.26  The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) of 198527 and 
the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 199028 were overtly structured to cut spending and 
to reduce the annual deficit.  They changed the primary goal of the Budget Act from one 
of neutral transparency about revenues and spending to one of creating pre-commitments 
23
 Conflict in the Congress was most notable about the rise of what was then known as 
“backdoor appropriations,” a reference to what is now generally regarded as “mandatory 
spending.”  See infra pp. 11-12.
24 DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 162 (quoting U.S. News and World Report 
describing the Budget Act as “a revolutionary budget reform”).
25 Id. at 181.
26
 Garrett, supra note 8, at 409 (“At least since 1985 and the adoption of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, many budget rules have instead been outcome oriented—Congress has 
intended them to work to reduce the deficit by placing additional hurdles in the way of 
new spending programs.”).
27
 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of 
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
28
 Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation and Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. No 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C.).
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to legislative structures that limit deficit-spending.  These actions were undertaken to 
provide a counterweight to the perceived intrinsic predilection for legislators to spend 
now and ask others to pay later.  The nature of the new structures and the special 
treatment they receive under procedural rules also ensures that the budget receives 
regular attention and becomes the framework for setting the legislative agenda.  
GRH had the simply stated goal of eliminating the annual deficit over a five-year 
period.  Its method was direct: the law set a maximum deficit level that declined by 20 
percent a year over five years, aiming toward a balanced budget.  To enforce these levels, 
it also established a sequester (an automatic across-the-board cut in programs29) to make 
projected spending fit that total.30  It is startling how directly this structure is lifted from 
29
 Note, however, the sequester was not evenhanded between raising new revenue or 
cutting spending:  It included neither an automatic increase in general revenues nor, as 
Garrett notes, a comparable across-the-board cut in tax expenditures.  Garrett, supra note 
8, at 397, 400 n.43.
30
 GRH, as enacted, created a complex mechanism for a sequester that relied in large part 
on decisions of the Comptroller General for its execution.  That engendered a significant 
Constitutional debate about the separation of powers and was ultimately struck down.  
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).  The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) was later given the given the final responsibility to implement the sequestration 
of the necessary funds.  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Reaffirmation Act 
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754; see also Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal 
Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 595, 597-98 
(1988).  Chairman Jim Saxton of the Joint Economic Committee gives a brief and clear 
description of sequesters.  See JIM SAXTON, EXTENDING THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT 
ACT: REVISION OF PAYGO RULES NECESSARY FOR BETTER TAX POLICY 2-3 (2002), at 
http://www.house.gov/jec/paygo.pdf.
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Buchanan’s 1977 proposal,31 albeit in statutory form rather than the Constitutional 
amendment that he had strongly recommended.32
But in the late 1980s, neither politics nor the economy was accommodating, and 
these deficit targets proved hard to hit.  The subsequent threatened sequester of hundreds 
of billions of dollars proved so unsupportable that it resulted in the elimination of the 
deficit targets altogether and in the eventual undoing of then-President George H.W. 
Bush’s explicit pledge of “no new taxes.”  Faced with a sequester so large, he and the 
leaders of Congress came together for a summit that resulted in legislation containing 
some spending cuts, some revenue increases, and a new means of reducing budgets.33
This new means took the form of further amendments to the Budget Act and made 
up the core of BEA as enacted.  BEA moved the process’s attention and limits away from 
the deficit and toward directly constraining the actions of the Congress itself.  BEA 
created pre-set limits on amounts that Congress could appropriate annually, as well as 
significant restraints on Congress’s ability to enact new spending commitments or new 
revenue reductions.  On top of the original framework of the 1974 Act, this is the shape 
31 See DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 187-89.  The degree of book-to-statute 
parallelism is perhaps less surprising when one remembers that then-Senator Gramm was 
a former economics professor, schooled in public choice theory and, apparently, familiar 
with Buchanan’s work.  See John J. Pitney Jr., Grand Gramm: Phil Gramm Retires, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, September 5, 2001, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-pitney090501.shtml.  Moreover, the 
Reagan Administration’s OMB Director, James C. Miller, is also a public-choice scholar 
and is credited with helping to pass the Gramm-Rudman law.  Shaw, supra note 14, at ¶ 
9.
32
 Buchanan and others long argued that a Constitutional amendment was necessary for 
success.  But cf. Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1105 (arguing that an amendment was unlikely to succeed for the very 
reasons that public-choice theorists criticized statutory efforts).
33
 Had the senior President Bush been operating under the Congressional budget process 
that now governs his son’s administration, he might never have been forced to renege on 
his pledge since the resulting structures no longer force sequesters on the basis of deficits.  
Other interesting contrasts about the budget treatment of the two wars in Iraq can also be 
made.  See Christian M.L. Bonat, What a Difference a (Financial) Coalition Makes: A 
Budgetary Analysis of Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Apr. 28, 2003) (unpublished 
student paper, on file with author). 
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of the budget process that has been in most recent use by the Congress and of most 
proposals to renew it. Those constraints (plus an extremely cooperative economy) had 
effects:  Deficits declined, surpluses appeared (by some measures), and there was even 
talk of retiring part of the cumulative debt.
By the end of fiscal year 2002, most of the limits of BEA had been allowed to 
expire altogether and, freed from any structural restraints, the President and the Congress 
cut taxes and increased spending aggressively.34  These actions (plus a once-again 
uncooperative economy) have also had effects:  Deficits have climbed to historic levels.
Recently, the Congress has considered reinstating and revising the basic structures 
of BEA.  Numerous changes have been proposed, both technical and substantive.  Most 
notably, consideration has been given to altering the treatment of tax legislation was 
dramatically, making tax reductions—whether across-the-board rate reductions or 
targeted tax breaks—procedurally much simpler than under BEA.35
Part Two:  The Basics of the Current Budget Process
Without confounding the reader with details, of necessity I must lay out a few of 
the basic terms and boundaries of the process as it exists before looking at the effect of 
the process on legislation.  There are, at a minimum, four essential concepts:





 It could be said that the politicians of the 1990s endured an era of fiscal discipline only 
to produce a surplus that the politicians of the 2000s gave away.  Such a budgetary 
prisoners’ dilemma may make it increasingly difficult for future politicians to find the 
will to discipline themselves.
35
 See Joel Friedman, Robert Greenstein, and James Horney, A Pay-As- You_Go Rule that 
Would Excempt All Tax Cuts Would Make a Mocker of Efforts to Restore Fiscal 
Discipline (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities:  March 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/3-20-06bud.pdf.
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Two—Maybe Three—Kinds of Money  
The cosmology of the Federal budget generally recognizes two types of money:  
discretionary spending and mandatory spending.36  They are treated differently in almost 
all respects, and they cannot be transmuted from one into the other.  
As the name implies, discretionary spending is money that is spent at the 
discretion of the Congress and the President.  It generally takes the form of annual 
appropriations and, while it may sit in Treasury accounts to be obligated over a period of 
years, for most purposes it is counted in the budget for the year in which it is enacted.37
Most government programs of grants and contracts (from highway construction to armed 
forces salaries to biomedical research grants) take the form of discretionary spending.
The legal presumption for discretionary spending is that it will not be renewed 
unless the Congress takes affirmative steps to do so.38  Every year, supporters of program 
spending must act to assure new money.  If the Congress in any one year chooses not to 
provide funds, no legal or procedural consequences result.  The program simply ceases to 
operate.  
In a more abstract fashion, discretionary spending can be thought of as budgeting 
by dollars.  Under a discretionary spending program for purchasing widgets, $100 million 
may be provided in any one year, and the actual number of widgets purchased depends on 
their price.
36
 “Discretionary spending” is also commonly known as “appropriated spending.”  
“Mandatory spending” is also commonly known as “direct spending.”
37
 The different usage of budget authority and outlay numbers is beyond the scope of this 
brief description.  I am describing budget authority here.
38
 This may not be the political presumption, inasmuch as programs that are funded 
develop an inertial force and often continue to be funded, but this is not a legal 
obligation.
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By contrast, mandatory spending is money that the law has promised will be 
provided.39  The legal consequences for a failure by the Congress to do so may vary,40 but 
the presumption is that necessary money will be available unless the Congress takes 
action to change the promise in the law.41
In the abstract, mandatory spending can be thought of as budgeting by goods and 
services.  Under a mandatory spending program for widgets, in any one year the law 
commands that all needed widgets be provided to a defined group of people and also 
promises that the money needed to do so will be made available.42
The relative proportions of discretionary and mandatory spending have reversed 
over the past forty years.  In 1964, about two-thirds of the unified Federal budget was 
made up of discretionary spending, most of it for defense.43  By 2004, about two-thirds of 
the unified budget was made up of mandatory spending, most of it for Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid.44  Projections of future spending show this trend continuing, 
39
 A subset of mandatory spending is referred to as “entitlement spending,” usually when 
describing funds spent for benefits to individuals.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 370, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/budget/glossary.pdf.
40
 Private rights of action for payment before the U.S. Court of Claims are the 
consequences usually contemplated.  E-mail from Richard Kogan, Senior Fellow, Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities, to Timothy M. Westmoreland, Visiting Professor of 
Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (June 1, 2005) (on file with author).  See, for instance, 
litigation brought to enforce an individual entitlement to Medicaid that is predicated on 
the Equal Rights Under the Law statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
41
 The obverse is true for permanent tax laws.  For budget purposes, the presumption is 
that revenues will continue to be collected unless Congress takes action to change the 
law.
42
 Variations on the theme of mandatory spending have begun to proliferate.  For 
example, the Child Health Insurance Program is a program of capped mandatory 
spending, i.e., one that provides an ongoing commitment for a fixed amount of money to 
each State.  42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(a) (2005).  Such a variation has the value of the 
presumed continuity of mandatory spending but does not obligate the Federal 
government to open-ended funding.  
43 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2006 
TO 2015 app. F at 138 tbl.F-5, 140 tbl.F-7 (2005), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/60xx/doc6060/01-25-BudgetOutlook.pdf.
44 Id.
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with significant additional growth in mandatory spending for payment of interest on the 
debt.45  Longer term projections indeed suggest that mandatory spending programs that 
are currently predicated on distinct revenue sources will begin to consume significant 
amounts of general revenue.46
As a historical and legal matter, what makes a program discretionary or 
mandatory has not always been obvious.  Certain hallmarks of discretionary spending are 
clear on first reading an enabling statute, such as “subject to the availability of 
appropriations,” or “there are authorized to be appropriated funds for … .”  Conversely, 
unless accompanied by such a discretionary indicator, the general statement that an 
officer of the Federal government “shall” do something has been taken to signify that the 
command is for mandatory spending.  But the distinction has not always been clear.  For 
instance, the Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Block Grant (Title V of the Social 
Security Act)47 and the Medicaid statute (Title XIX of the Social Security Act)48 contain 
very similar language about funding, but the former has been treated as a discretionary 
spending and the latter as mandatory.  
More recently, conference reports accompanying amendments to the Budget Act 
have simply gone through the catalogue of existing Federal programs and separated the 
discretionary sheep from the mandatory goats.49  Thus, by fiat issued well after the 
enabling statute, the MCH Block Grant is discretionary spending and Medicaid is 
45 OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2006 tbl.S-10, at 362 (2005) (projecting spending through 2010), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/budget/tables.pdf.  Note that CBO 
distinguishes payment of interest from all other forms of mandatory spending.  See
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 48, app. F at 138 tbl.F-5.
46 See sources cited supra note 10; The Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital 
Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, 2005 Annual 
Report 9 fig.II.D1 (2005), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/tr2005.pdf.  [See also Board of 
Trustees of the Social Security Administration, House Document 109-18 (April 5, 2005); 
and Weissman, Washington Post (March 24, 2005) Page A1.]
47
 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-710 (2005).
48
 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2005).
49 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-217, at 1014-53 (1997).
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mandatory; veterans’ health care is discretionary spending while veterans’ disability 
payments are mandatory.  As discussed below, this decision was sometimes made 
without clear rhyme or reason, and the implications are large.
Even more recently, new enactments are clearly designated as one type of money 
or the other.  There are newfound textual formulae to assure treatment as mandatory 
spending (e.g., “this constitutes budget authority in advance of appropriations acts”) that 
are a clear alternative to the usual text of discretionary spending.  If nothing else, the 
budget process now sets different procedures for enactment of legislation, depending on 
the type of money used, so the process used will likely make the type of money clear.50
In addition to these two types of money, a third, less obvious type is increasingly 
common:  revenues foregone, i.e., tax spending or tax expenditures.51  Tax expenditures 
are defined in the Budget Act as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal 
tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or 
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”52
Generally applicable changes in tax rates (e.g., reductions in personal income tax 
brackets) are not regarded as tax expenditures; they are simply reductions in revenues.  
But, targeted tax “breaks” that subsidize a specific activity or source of money (e.g., tax 
deductions or credits for money spent on a designated purpose) are regarded as 
something other than simple revenue measures.     
For deficit-calculation and accounting purposes, failing to bring money into the 
Treasury is the same as sending money out of it.53  Whether taxes are collected and spent 
50 See discussion of limits infra pp. 23-29.
51 See generally Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Expenditures as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 705 (1970); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J.
1155.
52
 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2005).
53
 For political and rhetorical purposes the two actions may be quite different.  See
Thuronyi, supra note 59, at 1178 n.140 (quoting H. Wells, Remarks at the Meeting of the 
Business and Commerce Political Action Committee (Feb. 20, 1986) (made upon 
Draft:  Do Not Quote, Cite, or Distribute
16
on widgets or whether widget-purchasers can deduct widget costs from their taxes, 
Federal money is used to reduce or pay the cost of widgets.  
However I list tax spending here as only an occasional type of money because the 
amount of such spending is very rarely added in or highlighted as part of the budget.  So, 
for example, in the discussion of how much of the budget is made up of discretionary 
spending and how much of mandatory, the denominator includes only money that comes 
into the government and goes out again.  When the Federal budget is calculated, it 
virtually never includes the money that went missing before it made it to the Treasury.54
Under the budget practices that were in place through 2002, legislative tax 
change—whether a change in general rates or the creation or deletion of tax spending—
was generally treated as the obverse of mandatory spending.  Increased taxes show up as 
positive numbers (i.e., revenues), and decreased taxes show up as negative numbers (i.e., 
spending).  Proposals have been made to treat tax spending distinctly.  
As with mandatory spending, tax expenditures have grown significantly in recent 
history.  The Congress makes periodic efforts to “simplify” the tax code and remove 
many (but never all) special exceptions,55 but these efforts have been followed by a new 
surge of special treatments for special interests.  In some areas of policy, tax spending is 
much higher than discretionary and mandatory spending combined.56  Indeed, in recent 
receiving Business Leader of the Year Award), “[S]ome personal tax deductions 
including interest paid on home mortgages are being referred to as tax expenditures . . . 
indicating the idea, it's the government's money that they are expending on you -- a pretty 
scarey prospect for a country that believes in free enterprise and democracy.”); see also
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: TAX EXPENDITURES DESERVE MORE SCRUTINY,
GAO/GGD/AIMD-94-122 (1994) 2 (“Some observers believe that labeling these 
provisions tax ‘expenditures’ implies that all forms of income inherently belong to the 
government.”), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151813.pdf.
54 See discussion infra pp. 35-37.
55
 This is most notably demonstrated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
56 Compare STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF 
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005-2009, JCS-1-05 (Comm. Print 
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estimates for 2006, tax spending is expected to exceed all of discretionary spending for 
the first time, both because of automatic growth in the value of the special treatment (e.g., 
home mortgage interest deductions rise as the size of mortgages rise) and because of 
newly enacted tax spending measures (e.g., the phase-out of limitations on deductions for 
high-income taxpayers).57
Tax spending has also changed in its nature.  Analyses of twenty-year trends show 
that, “[t]ax incentives to promote business investment have declined relative to the size of 
the economy, while tax incentives to promote social policy goals have expanded,”58 and 
that, in total, social tax expenditures are now four times the size of business tax 
expenditures.59
Baselines 
2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-1-05.pdf with OFFICE OF MGMT. AND 
BUDGET, supra note 50.
57 See John Cranford, Follow the Money: Tax Writers are Usurping the Appropriators’ 
Role, as Shadowy ‘Loopholes’ Supplant Clear-Cut Spending, 63 CQ WKLY. 814, 814 
(2005).  Compare CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 48, at 68 (discretionary outlays 
totaling $914 billion), with STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 64, 
at 30-40 tbl.1 (corporate and individual tax expenditures totaling over $915 billion).  In 
general, experts on tax expenditures are reluctant to add them up to make a total, since 
they may have interactive effects that make the total either larger or smaller than the sum 
or their parts. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, FISCAL YEAR 2006 at 315 (2005), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/spec.pdf.  
58
 Eric Toder, The Changing Composition of Tax Incentives: 1980-99, in PROCEEDINGS: 
91ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 411, 415 (Howard Chernick ed., 1999), 
available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410329, updated in Tax Reform and 
Fairness for Families: Presentation to the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform
(2005), at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/meetings/docs/steuerle.ppt 21 (testimony of 
Eugene Steurerle, Co-Director, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center).
59 Tax Reform and Fairness for Families, supra note 67.
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In all aspects of budgeting, the first and most important question is, “Compared to 
what?”60  In its most basic application, the question should be asked of every assertion 
that an amount of money is “new” or “large” or “generous” or “fair.”
The more technical use of the question is to follow a stream of mandatory 
spending.  If a statutory promise is to be fulfilled, the amount of money made available 
must be adequate for the purpose, but adequate compared to what?  Adequate when 
compared to the ongoing costs of the promise.
For a variety of reasons, providing the identical amount of money from one year 
to the next will likely be inadequate to keep the statutory promise.  Spending for 
Medicare in 1967, the first year of its full implementation, was $3.2 billion; spending in 
2004 was $297.4 billion.61  Much has changed in the Medicare statute over that period, 
but the basic promise of payment for medically necessary hospital and physician care has 
not.  Clearly, a promise to continue paying for these services could not be fulfilled by 
simply providing the previous year’s funding.
60
 In my own course on Federal Money, I discuss three questions for all budgets: 
“Compared to what?”;  “Or else what?”; and “Says who?”.  An instance of “Or else 
what?” has already been noted in the discussion of legal remedies for assuring the 
payment of mandatory spending or, conversely, the lack of legal remedies for unfunded 
discretionary programs.  “Says who?” relates to who calculates the budget numbers 
(CBO, OMB, or another party), a topic of great importance since CBO is nominally 
nonpartisan and OMB is an agent of the President.   
61 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 48, app. F at 142 tbl.F-9.  Medicaid spending has 
also grown dramatically during the same period, going from under $1 billion in 1966 to 
more than $175 billion today.  Id.  But because Medicaid programs are administered by 
the States, the Federal statute was not uniformly implemented on enactment and even 
today the required State financing of the program is subject to occasional waxing and 
waning. See John Klemm, Medicaid Spending: A Brief History, 22 HEALTH CARE FIN. 
REV. 105 (2000), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/review/00fall/00Fallpg105.pdf. 
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The most obvious reason for change over time is inflation.62  Since the enactment 
of Medicare and Medicaid, the cost of all goods and services has risen.  The cost of 
health and medical goods and services has risen dramatically.
Another obvious reason for the need for increased spending to maintain a statute’s 
promise is the growth in the number of beneficiaries.  As the “Baby Boom” generation 
ages, more people are eligible for such programs.  Likewise, in a recession, more people 
become eligible for means-tested programs and, in an epidemic, more people become 
eligible for health and disability programs.63
Yet another reason for the need for additional money is the advent of new drugs 
and technologies into the mix of covered goods and services that are to be financed.  For 
example, in 1965, standard diagnostics would have included x-rays; by 2002, such 
diagnostics would necessarily include much more sophisticated—and expensive—
devices, such as CAT scans and PET scans.  Similarly, in 1994, when the drug AZT was 
the standard of medical care, the medications for AIDS cost $1,500 per person per year; 
only one year later, when protease inhibitors were approved, the cost rose immediately to 
$15,000 per person per year.64
Thus, to keep the statutory promises in Medicare and Medicaid to pay for health 
services, mandatory spending must grow to reflect, at a minimum, the amount of money 
spent in the previous year plus inflation plus costs associated with increases in 
62
 The most familiar aspect of adjusting government spending to keep pace with inflation 
is the Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) made to Social Security payments.  COLAs 
were initially dependent on periodic Congressional action.  In 1972, the COLA was made 
both automatic and permanent.  Pub. L. No. 92-336, 86 Stat. 406, 412 (1972) (codified as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (2005)); see, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., BRIEF HISTORY, at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited June 15, 2005). 
63
 Making this even more complex, however, many people who are covered by Medicaid 
are “optional” beneficiaries under Federal law and, in times of economic downturn, may 
have their eligibility eliminated by the States.
64
 While Medicare has just begun to cover outpatient prescription drugs, (See Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-73, 
117 Stat. 2066 (2003)), Medicaid has for some time.  42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(12).  
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beneficiaries plus costs associated with new drugs and technologies.  Failure to grow by 
this amount would erode the purchasing power of the program and incrementally break 
the underlying legal promises.
To project and plan for these streams of mandatory spending, the CBO and the 
OMB create forecasting models that take these and many other variables into account.  
These estimates of what the current law will require to be spent in the future are called 
the “baseline.”  The baseline represents the budget for mandatory spending programs if 
they are presumed to be unamended and on statutory automatic pilot.  It assumes that 
Executive Branch agencies continue to interpret the statute reasonably (allowing payment 
for CAT scans as their use becomes generally accepted, adding protease inhibitors to the 
drug formularies, etc.) but that the Congress makes no further change to the statute.  
Baselines are used to forecast spending, annual deficits, the accumulated national debt, 
and payments of interest on the debt.
Baselines, while essential to budgeting, may be counterintuitive, sometimes with 
dramatic results.  In the presidential campaign of 1996, President Clinton accused Senator 
Dole of leading a Senate campaign to slash Medicare.  Senator Dole responded that, 
under the terms of his legislation, the program would be bigger than it ever had been in 
history.
To some extent, they were both right, depending on the chosen baseline.  The 
Medicare baseline for 1997 projected an increase in spending over the 1996 level of 
$8,100 per beneficiary.   Through various changes in the Medicare statute, it was 
estimated that the Dole proposal would have restricted that growth to $7,000 per 
beneficiary; this restriction and its aftermath would have reduced the Medicare baseline 
by $168 billion over the course of the succeeding five years.  Thus, Medicare would have 
been “cut” by $168 billion and, presumably, would have been able to purchase fewer 
goods and services for its beneficiaries.  But Medicare would also have continued to 
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grow over the years in nominal terms and would certainly have been bigger than it ever 
had been in history.65
Few people among the electorate likely understood the budgetary non-sequiturs of 
this debate, but many did care about it.  Indeed, some political observers have claimed 
that this argument, labeled “Mediscare” by the Republicans, actually made President 
Clinton successful in carrying Florida in the election.66
The obverse situation occurred in 2002.  The 2001 tax cuts were constructed to be 
phased in over several years.  In 2002, after the September 11 attacks and a dramatic 
slowdown in the economy, Senator Kennedy proposed that the rate of taxes be “frozen” 
at the planned 2004 levels and that anticipated further cuts be postponed or eliminated.67
Both the President and the Treasury Secretary immediately characterized the proposal as 
“raising taxes.”68  Again, to some extent, both the Administration and the Senator were 
both right, depending on the chosen baseline.  As one budget advocacy group noted, 
“under [the Kennedy] proposal, no tax rates would be raised above their current level. 
Rather, he called for rolling back future tax cuts”69  But anti-tax groups called on 
Members of Congress who had signed no-new-tax pledges to oppose the Kennedy 
proposal as a tax hike, and it did not prevail.
Baselines do not generally enter into discussion of discretionary spending, 
although that in itself is significant. Because comparisons in discretionary spending are 
made only on the basis of actual dollar levels and without a measure of purchasing 
65
 For a detailed comparison, see Adam Nagourney, Clinton Forecasts Budget Cuts to 
Scare Elderly, Dole Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, §1, at 32.
66 See, e.g., Allison Mitchell, Clinton Seeks Florida Votes with a Focus on Medicare, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at B10.  
67 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, KENNEDY TAX FREEZE KEEPS BUSH TAX CUTS FOR ALL 
BUT RICHEST (2002), at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/kenn0102.pdf 1.
68
 Scott Shepard, Kennedy Calls for Delay of Tax Cuts, Kicking Off Debate, COX NEWS 
SERV. (Jan. 16, 2002).
69 JOEL FRIEDMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, CRITICISMS OF 
KENNEDY TAX PROPOSAL: IGNORE ITS SUBSTANCE AND DISTORT ITS IMPACT 1 (2002), at
http://www.cbpp.org/1-22-02tax.pdf. 
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power, appropriations for discretionary spending may rise year after year but nonetheless 
fall further and further behind the true need for spending.  So, for example, in a 
discretionary grants program for drugs for uninsured people with AIDS, if the price of 
drugs and/or the number of people who need them grows faster than the available 
discretionary funds, a progressively smaller proportion of people in need can be 
assisted.70
The CBO recalculates and corrects its baseline twice each fiscal year.   This 
recalculation of baseline is obviously a complex task, including many variables that often 
interact.  If, for example, a new pediatric vaccine is approved, then the CBO’s next 
recalculation of the baseline will include both the projected cost of the vaccine to 
Medicaid and the expected savings from reductions in treatment costs.  Once these 
adjustments are done, all future projections will be made from this corrected baseline 
until it, too, is later recalculated.  
Scorekeeping
Baselines are also used as the basis for comparison in estimating the impact of 
proposed legislation.  The projection of such incremental costs or savings is referred to as 
”scorekeeping.”  For most purposes in the Congress, the CBO is the official 
scorekeeper.71
The costs of any proposed expansions—or savings from any proposed cuts—in 
mandatory spending programs are measured against the baseline.  Thus, if legislation 
were proposed to make a new group of people eligible for Medicaid, the CBO would 
estimate the incremental increased costs of this proposal over and above the spending 
increases that would be automatically incurred for the current group of Medicaid-eligible 
70 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WAITING FOR AIDS MEDICATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF ADAP WAITING LISTS (2004), at
http://www.kff.org/hivaids/7230.cfm (follow “Fact Sheet” hyperlink).  
71
 OMB also has some scoring responsibilities, but they are beyond the scope of this brief 
introduction. 
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people.  Conversely, if legislation were proposed to close Medicaid to a group of people 
currently eligible under the law, the CBO would estimate the incremental “savings” that 
would result in projected spending if the proposal were enacted.72
The scorekeeping of proposed legislation, like the calculation of the baseline, is 
complex.  For example, the CBO was recently called upon to estimate the costs of 
detailed legislation to provide a prescription drug benefit in Medicare.  In a published 
description of its methodology,73 the CBO identified six complex “key assumptions,”74
and myriad subsidiary ones used simply to construct the model.  Almost any one of the 
assumptions could keep an army of health economists busy debating and fine-tuning.  
The data sources used in the model could also employ surveyors, demographers, and 
marketers for years.  And, of course, the legislative language that is being used as the 
basis for the model is open to statutory interpretation.75  But, in a variant on the show 
business motto “I don’t want it good, I want it Tuesday,”76 the CBO cranks out estimates 
on Congressional demand under these extremely adverse circumstances.   
While the work done by the CBO is very credible and subject to intense review 
and criticism by interested parties, no one is under any illusion that the score produced 
72
 Likewise, in scoring tax legislation, CBO estimates the increase or decrease in 
expected revenues when compared to the baseline of existing tax law.  For an amusing 
and generally accurate discussion of scorekeeping, see Dave Barry, Getting a Grip on (or 
Taste of) the Budget Deficit, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 1991, at 31 (“This is exactly how our 
leaders ‘reduce’ the pesky budget deficit—by not increasing it as much as they thought 
they were going to.”).
73 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3.
74 Id. at 36-37 (identifying its key assumptions as beneficiary participation rate, price 
effect, cost-management factor, induced demand, marketing costs, and risk-premium 
costs).
75
 Consider, for instance, the statutory interpretation issues implicit in the estimation of 
the impact of an amendment to the Medicaid law banning services to undocumented 
aliens “except in an emergency.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2005).
76
 In my own experience, I was once asked by a scorekeeper (not from CBO) in 1992 to 
estimate the costs of AIDS drugs over the next ten years.  My first question was, “Give 
me some guidance: Did we stop the epidemic or not?”  Similar exercises in science 
fiction are common in scorekeeping lore.
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will prove to be correct.77  Rather, it is an educated best guess, and, more important, a 
number that all Congressional actors have committed in advance to accept for purposes 
of lawmaking.  The near-constant carping by dissatisfied Members of Congress, interest 
groups, or journalists that the CBO estimates are “wrong” misses the point of the 
exercise.  The CBO score is deemed to be correct by the agreements on how the budget 
process is to work, and all legislative rules and actions follow from it.  This deemed-
correct score is imaginary, but some version of it is a necessary fiction for budgeting.
Limits
As noted above, after the crisis created by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in 1990, the 
Budget Act no longer contains limits on deficits per se.  Instead under the Budget Act, as 
amended by the Budget Enforcement Act, different limits were imposed on 
Congressional actions regarding the two types of money.  For discretionary spending a 
global cap, i.e., a set amount specified in statute, often years in advance, became the limit 
for all annual appropriations legislation.  The total of all discretionary funds for such 
disparate activities as defense, agriculture, and education could not exceed this limit.  
In turn, this global amount was divided into subsidiary caps.78  Any legislation (or 
any amendment to legislation) that would violate either the global caps or the subsidiary 
77 See The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-2013: Before the Senate 
Committee on the Budget, 108th Cong. fig. 2 (2003) (statement of Barry B. Anderson, 
Acting Director, Cong. Budget Office, showing the uncertainty of estimates by CBO), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4031/01-30-03-SenateTestimony.pdf 
7; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE UNCERTAINTY OF BUDGET PROJECTIONS: A DISCUSSION 
OF DATA AND METHODS (2005), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/61xx/doc6119/02-25-Uncertainty.pdf.  It should be noted 
that in other settings, forecasters and modelers rarely come up with a single number, a so-
called “point estimate.”  They consider a range of probabilities to be a much preferable 
method that gives some notice of the uncertainties and interactive effects implicit in 
estimation.  But the Budget Act asks them for a number, and the CBO produces one.  See
Sherry Glied et al., Health Policy Roundtable–Policy by Numbers: The Role of Estimates 
and Scoring in Health Care Reform, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 347 (2005).
78
 These subsidiary caps are not divided clearly by subject matter but rather by the 
jurisdiction of the appropriations subcommittee that will produce the legislation.  This, 
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caps was subject to a point of order79 and generally could not be considered by the House 
or the Senate.  Such points of order could be waived under some circumstances, but 
generally only by a so-called “supermajority” of 60% of the Senate.80
This overall cap obviously created a true zero-sum game for any new funding 
initiatives.  To fund a new program, its proponents had to find an existing one to cut.  In 
broad terms, this forced choice meant that to create a Federally funded education 
initiative, defense funds had to be cut (or vice versa).81  In narrower terms, it may be that 
a budget increased basic biomedical research funding at the expense of activities to apply 
research to public health.82
Less obviously, the caps also created a problem for existing programs.  For years, 
as a means of gradually reducing spending, the caps were deliberately set below the 
too, creates some strange artifacts.  One subcommittee, for example, has jurisdiction over 
programs administered by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and 
Education.  Thus, an education initiative may jeopardize funds for public health programs 
or the enforcement of labor standards.  Other subcommittees have more straightforward 
jurisdictions, such as military construction, that may not produce such unexpected 
crosscurrents.  Garrett, supra note 8, at 401, describes increases in funding for law 
enforcement programs funded by cutting funds for Departments of State, Justice, and 
Commerce.  A discussion of these artifacts, a longstanding feature of appropriations 
process and not created by the Budget Act, is beyond the scope of this general 
introductory paper. 
79
 2 U.S.C. § 633(f) (2005).  Note that points of order can be procedurally fatal to the 
consideration of legislation.
80
 2 U.S.C. § 900 note (2005).  The constitutionality and appropriateness of legislative 
supermajority rules has been debated.  Compare Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter 
to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995) (arguing that supermajority rules 
are against the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution and the measure is not 
supported by the Constitution or Congressional practice) with John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: 
A Defense,” 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995).
81
 Compare mid-Nineties budgets with early 21st Century ones for exactly this dynamic.
82 See The President’s Budget for 2002, Hearings Before the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, 107th Cong.  (2001) (in which Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary 
of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., explains that funding for the Cntrs. for 
Disease Control and Prev. (CDC) was cut so that funding for the Nat’l Insts. of Health 
(NIH)  could be increased).  
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projected rate of inflation.83  This pre-set limit in itself meant that the purchasing power 
of discretionary spending erodes over time, and that a proponent of an activity constantly 
had to seek cuts in other programs simply to keep the favored activity at the same 
purchasing power.  
Compounding these effects, of course, were the very same issues described above 
in the discussion of baselines.  Changes in demographics and in epidemiology, expensive 
innovation in technology, etc., all could sharply erode the purchasing power of even an 
inflation-adjusted amount.84  Again, underneath a global cap, a proponent of an ongoing 
activity had to find other programs to cannibalize simply to keep providing the same 
goods and services as the previous year.  This dynamic created a lamb-eat-lamb85
atmosphere in most discretionary spending deliberations, sometimes leading to 
unexpected results, such as the American Heart Association advertising and lobbying that 
research into HIV/AIDS is over-funded.86
In contrast, mandatory spending was not governed by an annual spending cap.
For all the reasons outlined in the discussion of baselines, above, annual caps would 
erode or nullify the legal promises of mandatory spending statutes.87  Under current 
83
 Note also that, while inflation for the purpose of assessing caps is a single number 
across all fields of endeavor, inflation is not a simple measure in program spending.  
Inflation in biomedical research activities, for example, has steadily been in double digits, 
even while inflation in wages and the general consumer price index have been low.  
Thus, an inflator that may be generous for activities that consist largely of personnel will 
be quite constrictive of activities that consist largely of research equipment or 
prescription drugs.
84
 Consider, for example, a discretionary spending program intended to distribute 
prescription drugs to low-income people.  Increases in rates of poverty, of illness, or of 
drug prices would all diminish the value of funding that remains exactly the same from 
one year to the next.   
85
 Garrett memorably describes the situation as requiring that “those seeking federal 
funds must also adopt the role of funding predator.”  Garrett, supra note 8, at 400.
86
 See Esther Kaplan, The Attack of the Killer Causes, POZ, May 2000, available at
http://www.poz.com/index.cfm1928.shtml.
87
 This is not to say that caps on mandatory spending have not been proposed.  See BRIAN 
M. RIEDL, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE FEDERAL BUDGET: GETTING SPENDING UNDER 
CONTROL (2003) (proposing “omnicaps,” caps that cover both discretionary and 
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budget process, mandatory spending is allowed to grow over time, as the internal dictates 
of the enabling statute require.88
But through 2002, the Budget Act, as amended, restricted any new legislation to 
expand mandatory spending.  This restriction took the form of a requirement for 
Congress to “Pay-as-You-Go” (or PAYGO) when considering such legislation.  In 
essence, the PAYGO rules required that the Congress not pass legislation that had an 
estimated net cost greater than zero, i.e., laws that would have increased the deficit above 
the level anticipated in the baseline.  If a bill would have increased mandatory spending 
above the baseline, the Congress also had to enact legislation that would provide for 
offsetting reductions in another area of mandatory spending.  The Congress could also 
have increased revenues by an offsetting amount to pay for the new spending.89
The two scores were not required to balance in the first year after enactment of 
the statute.  Under the most recent rules in effect, they had to balance within a “snapshot” 
period of five years, i.e., the year for which the budget is being written and the four years 
that follow it.90
These PAYGO requirements acted as a substantial brake on new initiatives.  The 
Congress has been very reluctant to raise new revenues over the past decade and, indeed, 
mandatory spending, as a way to control spending and allow for trade-offs across all 
programs), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/agenda_budget.cfm.  
Also note that GRH, while not focusing on spending, had the same effect by focusing on 
annual deficits.
88
 Likewise, Federal revenues wax and wane over time, as the internal dictates of the tax 
law require.
89
 [REVISE NOTE TO REFLECT 2005 CHANGES]  Again, revenues were treated in 
the same manner: If a proposed change was estimated to lower revenues, it had to comply 
with the PAYGO requirements and be matched with either a corresponding cut in 
spending or an offsetting increase in another area of revenues.
90
 The most recent Senate rules in effect required balance in a five-year snapshot and in a 
ten-year snapshot.  The ten-year snapshot was added as an attempt to control 
manipulation of legislation to have its major effects outside the period being scored.  A 
long (and occasionally colorful) history exists of efforts to dodge scorekeeping through 
delayed effective dates.
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the Budget Act now requires a supermajority of each body to do so.91  Consequently, the 
source of all offsets was generally limited to cutting existing programs.  Since the 
beneficiaries of existing programs are usually strong advocates for the continuation of 
those programs, meeting the requirements was usually difficult or impossible.
Any proposal to do so had to, of course, go through scorekeeping.   At this point, 
the score became much more than an illustrative projection by the CBO.  The score of the 
cost of the proposal against baseline and the score of the cost of the offsets against 
baseline became the sole threshold issue of whether the proposal could even be 
considered.   As with violations of the discretionary spending caps, any legislation (or 
any amendment to legislation) that would have violated the PAYGO limits was subject to 
a point of order and generally could not be considered by the House or the Senate.  
Again, such points of order could be waived under some circumstances, but only by a 
supermajority of 60% of the Senate.92
The legislative outcome of PAYGO was, therefore, that a proposal to expand 
mandatory spending might have had the support of a majority of Members of Congress 
but be still have been prohibited from being considered.  This outcome is certainly not 
unprecedented in legislation: with stubborn committees or leaders in either body or 
filibusters in the Senate, many bills have been bottled up that had the votes to pass.93
It was, however, unprecedented for the Congress to delegate this power to make
or break legislation to a body of unelected staff people who are nominally carrying out a 
91 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 109TH CONG., RULE XXI cl. 5(b) (2005) 
(“A bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a Federal income 
tax rate increase may not be considered as passed or agreed to unless so determined by a 
vote of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting, a quorum being present.”).
92
 Under previous rules, as discussed supra, if Congress exceeded the PAYGO limits, 
there were to be across-the-board sequestrations in non-exempt direct spending programs.  
See 2 U.S.C. § 902 (2005), but such enforcement of the PAYGO limits is limited to 
legislation enacted before Oct. 1, 2002. 
93 Cf. McGinnis and Rappaport, supra note 93.
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formulaic estimating activity.94  In principle, the Congress could amend its own rules or 
the Budget Act to allow the legislative amendment of a CBO score or to allow a 
PAYGO-violating measure to proceed without a super-majority.  But in practice the CBO 
had more authority over mandatory spending measures than any Member of the House 
and as much as any filibustering Senator.95
In recent proposals passed by the House and the Senate, the Congress has tried to 
reduce the reach of PAYGO, treating tax expenditures differently than other forms of 
mandatory spending.  PAYGO would still apply for affirmative mandatory spending, but 
it would no longer apply to taxes.  Thus, legislation to expand spending in Medicare 
would be required to be offset by concomitant cuts in other mandatory programs, but 
reductions in taxes (whether overall or as specific tax expenditures) would not.  
Reconciling this approach with an ostensible goal of deficit-reduction is difficult; it is 
apparently an attempt to facilitate tax cuts, whatever the deficit.96  These proposals have 
not yet been agreed to, and much debate still continues.97
94
 It could be argued that a similar delegation has been made to the parliamentarians of 
each body; indeed, their decisions may be as functionally decisive as the CBO’s.  But the 
parliamentarians serve in a purely advisory capacity to the presiding officer in each body 
and the officer may, in theory, disregard their advice when he or she is making a 
parliamentary ruling.  As the budget rules are written, CBO’s estimates of PAYGO 
expenses (and of arcane provisions regarding outlays of discretionary spending) may not 
be disregarded.  Moreover, the parliamentarians are interpreting rules of the Congress’s 
own making, while the CBO is arguably interpreting some often unarticulated vision of 
economic theory and fact which the Congress then must use as a conclusive element of 
deciding whether a proposal may move forward.
95
 Stopping a filibuster also requires a supermajority of 60 votes in the Senate.  Standing 
Rules of the Senate, Rule XXII (2000), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/standingrules.txt.  Additionally, it should be noted that, 
because of changes in the Senate rules regarding the budget process, certain legislation 
implementing the budget may not be filibustered; in these instances, the CBO score is 
arguably more protected than a Senator’s right to filibuster.  CONSIDER DISCUSSION 
OF NONDELEGATION QUESTION
96 Cf. 150 CONG. REC. H4967-68 (2004) (statement of Rep. Berkley); RICHARD KOGAN, 
THE NEED TO RESTORE PAY-AS-YOU-GO BUDGET ENFORCEMENT FOR TAX CUTS AND 
ENTITLEMENTS (2005), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-14-05bud.pdf.
97
 See Friedman, supra  n. 
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Since 2002, no discretionary spending caps or true PAYGO limits have been in 
place.  There have been frequent plans laid out and the Senate has retained a much-
weakened form of PAYGO in its own rules, but no statutory changes analogous to GRH 
or BEA have been enacted.
Part Three:  Invisible Effects of the Budget Process
Public-choice theorists argue that the very structure of American politics tends 
toward the rule that “Politicians naturally want to spend and to avoid taxing.”98  They go 
on to argue that, when this structure is combined with Keynesian theories of 
macroeconomics, the pull toward deficit spending is almost irresistible.99  They conclude 
by arguing that the creation of massive deficits is an intergenerational100 transfer that is 
“fiscal folly”101 and “fiscal irresponsibility.”102  At base, the opposition to deficit 
spending is made almost as a moral argument that future generations ought not to be 
burdened with the cost of the consumption of present ones.    
98 DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 190.
99
 James N. Buchanan, Concerning Future Generations, PUBLIC PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC 
DEBT: A DEFENSE AND RESTATEMENT, Liberty Fund, Inc. (1999), available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/buchanan/buchcv2c4.html; [hereinafter PUBLIC DEBT]. 
100 Id.  While I use the word “intergenerational” to have its common meaning (as in “an 
intergenerational transfer that mortgages the future of our children"), Buchanan uses the 
term “intergenerational” in a very far-reaching way. He regards 
a ‘future generation’ as any set of individuals living in any time period 
following that in which the debt is created. The actual length of the time 
periods may be arbitrarily designated, and the analysis may be conducted 
in terms of weeks, months, years, decades, or centuries. The length of the 
period per se is not relevant… In other words, I shall not be concerned as 
to whether a public debt burden is transferred to our children or 
grandchildren as such. I shall be concerned with whether or not the debt 
burden can be postponed.  
Id. at 27-28.  Either use of the term makes the point.
101 DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 10.
102 Id. at 36.
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The Federal budget process was created in large part in response to these 
arguments and their more political parallels.103  In an effort to provide a counterbalance 
to the perceived structural tendency toward deficit spending, GRH and BEA created the 
significant pre-commitment devices of global caps on discretionary spending, PAYGO 
rules for mandatory spending, supermajorities to waive them, and sequesters.
These devices appear to have worked, at least for a while.  For one brief shining 
moment a Federal surplus emerged in Fiscal Year 2000.  But so many confounding 
variables are at work that the case for the effectiveness of the budget rules is unclear even 
during this period.  Caps and PAYGO existed largely during an economic boom, during a 
period of divided government that often produced legislative deadlocks, and during a 
time in which the President had espoused the goal of balancing the budget.  The surplus 
can be explained by any or all.104
These days are quite different.  The budget limits expired at the end of 2002, the 
boom is gone.  The legislative and executive branches have come together to cut 
103 See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Business Leaders During a White 
House Briefing on the Federal Budget and Deficit Reduction (Oct. 18, 1985), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/101885a.htm (“[T]he American 
people want us to end this deficit spending that has been mortgaging the future of our 
children”); President George Bush, Remarks to Industrial League of Orange County in 
Irvine, California (June 19, 1992), available at
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1992/92061900.html (“[T]he American 
people want and are properly demanding: the elimination of these deficits that are 
mortgaging the future of our children”); see also DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12, 
at 3 (“future generations in bondage by deficit financing”).
104 Compare National and Homeland Security: Meeting Our Needs,Hearing on 
Homeland Security and Defense Spending Before the House Budget Comm., 109th Cong. 
17 (2005) (statement of James Jay Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage 
Found.) (attributing the budget surplus to reduced defense spending, the economic boom, 
and the divided government), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/109hcat1.html (follow “National and Homeland 
Security: Meeting Our Needs” hyperlink), with Robert L. Borosage, Clinton’s Budget 
Legacy Lives On, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, at M2 (suggesting that Democrats attribute 
the budget surplus to President Bill Clinton’s political discipline) and The Truth about 
Entitlements and the Budget, The Concord Coalition, Volume III, Number 13 (Sept. 8, 
1997) available at http://www.concordcoalition.org/facing-facts/ff_fax40.html (stating 
that spending restraint is the key to having a budget surplus).
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revenues and increase spending dramatically.105  The Executive Branch has concluded 
that the vanishing surplus was “‘incredibly positive news’ because it would halt the 
growth of the federal government”106  and that “deficits don’t matter.”107
But the budget process is coming back.  The Congress and the President have 
discussed new versions of PAYGO108 and the discretionary caps and have described a 
goal of reducing the deficit by half within five years.109
So the time has come to look at the invisible effects that this process has created.  
Before re-applying the ostensible cures, their side effects should be studied.  While 
focusing on the deficit as a whole, the theorists and the practitioners have overlooked the 
many distortions that their own structures have created in other parts of lawmaking.  
Buchanan says that the effect of these structures will be to “require only that the costs and 
benefits of public-spending programs be taken more explicitly into account”110 and “[t]he 
rule will have the effect of bringing the real costs of public outlays to the awareness of 
decision makers.”111  But the details of taking “into account” and assessing “the real 
costs” conceal many values and decisions.
105 See RICHARD KOGAN & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES, THE NEW CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE FORECAST AND THE 
REMARKABLE DETERIORATION OF THE SURPLUS (2002), at http://www.cbpp.org/3-30-
05bud.pdf.  Self-described fiscal conservatives have joined the cutting and spending, too, 
arguing perversely that they are accelerating the deficit because only a deficit will make 
them stop.  Cf. David Firestone, Conservatives Now See Deficits as a Tool to Fight 
Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at 24 (quoting Rep. Susan Myrick) (“Anything that 
will help us stop spending money, I'm in favor of….  And if there's a deficit, that may 
help us”); Paul Krugman, The Tax-Cut Con, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 54 
(discussing “Starve-the-Beast” arguments).
106
 David Sanger, President Asserts Shrunken Surplus May Curb Congress, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2001, at 1.
107
 John Cassidy, Taxing, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2004 (quoting Richard Cheney as 
quoted by Paul O’Neil), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/content/?040126ta_talk_cassidy.
108 It should be noted that the PAYGO process being considered is dramatically different 
than the one of BEA.  See discussion infra.
109
 David Broder, Haste Makes Waste, WASH. POST, May 5, 2005, at A25.
110 DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 188-89.
111 Id. at 185.
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The budget process has myriad arbitrary effects on policy and legislation.  As 
noted, the juxtaposition of discretionary spending within a subcommittee’s jurisdiction 
can force choices between two worthy subcommittee priorities while leaving less worthy 
programs outside the jurisdiction unscathed.112  Likewise, a need for a PAYGO offset 
may extinguish a mandatory program that is performing well.  Close observation of 
Congress will find such outcomes every legislative day and, while the result may 
sometimes seem arbitrary, it is not unclear or unexpected.
But the process also has more systemic skewing effects on legislation that are 
largely unexplored.  Untangling some of these effects may lead to a clearer understanding 
of the legislative process and to the possibility of assessment of policy through a different 
lens.  Some are historical artifacts.  Some are intrinsic to the chosen systems of control.  
And some are intrinsic to all estimation.  They are generally invisible.  They may exist 
alone or may compound each other.  But they all undermine the validity of the process as
it has been implemented.  
“Type of Money” Effects:  Discretionary Money Breaks Promises  
As has been noted, the formal Congressional budget process is a relative 
innovation.  Many statutes were written and many programs created well before it was 
adopted, and the process by which they were incorporated into it was not uniform.
For example, from at least the early Nineteenth Century, the Federal government 
had expressed responsibility for providing health care for Indian peoples.113  Whether 
112 Cf. Garrett, supra note 8, at 401 (discussion of State Department cuts).
113 E.g., Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche, Art. 14, 15 Stat. 581 (1867); Treaty with 
the Crows, Art. 10, 15 Stat. 649 (1868); Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshoni, Art. 10, 
15 Stat. 673 (1868); Treaty with the Northern Cheyenne, Art. 13, 15 Stat. 655 (1868); see 
also Exec. Order No. 13,084, 3 C.F.R. § 150 (1998), reprinted in 25 U.S.C.S. § 450 
(1998); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).  See generally
Steven Kunitz, The History and Politics of U.S. Health Care Policy for American Indians 
and Alaskan Natives, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1464-73 (1996). 
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expressed in terms of “wards and guardians” or of “aid and subsistence,” treaties, 
statutes, and court holdings indicated some basic obligation of the Federal government 
and right of the Native American peoples.  The major modern embodiment of that 
obligation today is the Indian Health Service (I.H.S.).114
When the catalogue of programs was divided into discretionary and mandatory 
spending categories for budget purposes, however, the I.H.S. was deemed discretionary, 
notwithstanding previous statements of legal obligation.  As a result, this health care 
program has been put into competition with other discretionary spending activities, many 
of which have much stronger popular support.  I.H.S.’s growth in spending was limited to 
the Congress’s generosity and not tied to increases in need or the cost of care.  
For a demonstration of the significance of this categorization, one need only 
compare the per person growth in the I.H.S. programs and those in the mandatory 
spending programs of Medicare and Medicaid.  (See figure.115)  Between 1980 and 2002, 
Medicare per capita spending grew at an average of 7.8% per year, Medicaid at 6.9% per 
year, and I.H.S. at only 4.8% per year. Had I.H.S. per capita appropriations grown at the 
Medicare rate during this period, the I.H.S. per capita spending would have been almost 
double ($3,260 per capita rather than $1,752).  Any pretense that the programs can each 
purchase an adequate package of health services becomes less credible as time proceeds.  
Even as appropriations for I.H.S. increase, they fall further and further behind a Medicare 
benchmark on a per capita basis.116
114
 If they meet the criteria of the programs, Native Americans are also eligible for 
Medicaid and Medicare, and the I.H.S. is reimbursed for services rendered to 
beneficiaries of those programs.  Thus, some Indians receive health benefits financed by 
mandatory spending.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(j).  See also Bonnie M. Duran, American 
Indian/Alaska Native Health Policy, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 758 (2005).
115
 Timothy M. Westmoreland & Kathryn R. Watson, Filling Hollow Promises: 
Correcting the Budget Treatment of Health Care for American Indians and Alaska 
Natives, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 600 (April 2006).  
116 Id.











Medicare $1,200 $2,200 $3,100 $4,700 $5,400 $6,200
Medicaid $1,100 $1,800 $2,700 $4,200 $4,400 $4,800
IHS $631 $814 $1,080 $1,403 $1,544 $1,752
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002
These funding shortfalls are not simply abstractions.  The age-adjusted death rate 
for Indians is 50% higher than for non-Indians, and the number of years of potential life 
lost (another measure of premature mortality) is 70% higher.117  It is likely that these 
disparities in health status are related to the health care funding available to them, 
funding that started at a lower level than other programs and that has lagged behind more 
and more over time.
Congress could have chosen to appropriate dollars at an adequate level for the 
I.H.S.  But the political process of annual appropriations is heavy lifting. The zero-sum 
nature of the discretionary spending caps compounded by the high inflation in health care 
costs makes it even more so.  Had the historical promises of goods and services been 
recognized as requiring treatment of I.H.S. as mandatory spending, the increases in 
funding would have occurred automatically over the years, without lifting, as they do for 
Medicare and Medicaid.  
117 PROGRAM STATISTICS TEAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH: 1998-99 (1999), available at
http://www.ihs.gov/PublicInfo/Publications/trends98/part4.pdf. 
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Another example of a budgetary mismatch between type of spending and a 
promise is the correctional health budget of the Department of Justice.  The provision of 
health care services to Federal prisoners is, at some Constitutional level, an enforceable 
obligation of the Federal government.118  Correctional health budgets are, however, 
designated as discretionary spending and must compete with such politically popular 
Justice Department line items as the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration.119  It 
is perhaps not surprising that correctional health services are often under-funded and 
inadequately staffed.120
Similar accidents of history and taxonomy can be found throughout the Federal 
budget.  Wherever a promise was made but then subordinated to the limits of 
discretionary spending, the effect in any time of Federal fiscal restraint or of dramatic 
increase in costs is to undermine the promise.121
“Type of Money” Effects:  Tax Spending is Opaque
118 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); cf. C.G. Carrabba, Prisoners’ 
Constitutional Right to Medical Treatment: A Right Without Substance, NEW ENG. J.
PRISON L. 341, 341-77 (1981).
119
 The idiosyncratic division of jurisdiction of appropriations subcommittees has also 
resulted in competition for resources with programs administered by the State 
Department and the Commerce Department. Note also that neither Federal nor State 
prisoners are eligible for Medicaid, thus depriving correctional health programs of the 
cross-subsidy of mandatory spending that benefits the I.H.S.  See 42 C.F.R. § 435.1008 
(2002).
120
 Eric Montague, Wash. Policy Ctr., Prison Health Care: Healing a Sick System 
through Private Competition, 
http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/ConOutPrivatization/PNPrisonHealthCare03-08.html
(last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
121
 A particularly farcical problem recently arose because the Constitutional provision for 
a census is subject to discretionary spending limits and vagaries.  FY 2000 was a bad year 
under the cap, and spending for the Year 2000 census was, in fact, denominated an 
“unexpected emergency” in order to allow for funding outside the caps. See generally 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 and Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999). 
Draft:  Do Not Quote, Cite, or Distribute
37
While those programs assigned to discretionary spending may be disadvantaged 
by the competition for funds and the heavy lifting of annual renewals, those activities 
supported by tax spending enjoy clear advantages over those supported by either of the 
other types of money.  As noted above, tax spending is not counted as an overt part of the 
budget.  The President’s budget proposal annually includes a chapter in its appendix on 
tax expenditures122 and the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation publishes an 
annual staff report on them,123 but when the President announces his budget totals, the 
“spending” categories include only those programs that are outlays from the Treasury and 
omit those activities that were subsidized by revenues foregone.  
Moreover, the popular understanding of the budget does not include tax spending.  
When the press covers the size and reach of the government’s activities, it discusses the 
total outlays, not the unreceived taxes.  The tax expenditures are implicitly in the budget, 
represented by a lower baseline for revenues than would be projected if they did not exist, 
but they are not part of the idea of programmatic spending.  For instance, this year’s 
President’s budget was almost universally described as a “$2.57 trillion budget;”124 this is 
the total of discretionary and mandatory spending.  Had the tax spending been included in 
the total, it would have been a $3.49 trillion budget, a 36% increase or almost a trillion 
dollars more.125
This absence from the budget is significant in two ways.  First, tax spending is 
generally “out-of-sight, out-of-mind.”126  Most tax provisions have no fixed expiration 
122 E.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 65, at 327-442.
123 E.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 64.
124 See e.g., Jim VandeHei, Bush Begins Push for Budget; President Talks of Discipline, 
Sacrifice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at A06.  But see, Gail R. Chaddock, Why This 
Budget Battle Has an Epic Tone, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 9, 2005 (stating the 
budget as $2.75 trillion, but also stating certain tax expenditures).
125
 David L. Brumbaugh et al., Overview of the Federal Tax System, CONG. RES. SERV.
14 tbl.6 (2005) (stating the sum of tax expenditures estimated for 2006 as $921 billion, a 
simple addition of all separate provisions); see OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra
note 65 and accompanying text.
126
 Cranford, supra note 56, at 814.
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date,127 and, thus, like mandatory spending programs, they continue to spend unless the 
Congress takes action to change the statute.128  But unlike mandatory spending programs, 
they are invisible and “do not overtly compete in the annual budget process.”129  So, in 
the annual budget fights, the competition is among those programs that overtly expend 
money from the Treasury and usually does not include those enacted laws that keep 
money out of it in the first place.  The GAO has concluded that, “As a result, 
policymakers have few opportunities to make explicit comparisons or trade-offs between 
tax expenditures and federal spending programs.”130
The second effect of this absence from annual estimation and competition is that 
tax spending is rarely—certainly not annually—evaluated for its reach or effectiveness.  
“[R]eviews are not conducted systematically and may not explicitly consider possible 
trade-offs between tax expenditures and federal outlay programs and mandates.”131  Or, 
as one observer of Congress has recently written, 
[I]n the case of appropriations, where every dime can be counted by the 
Treasury and the recipients identified, it is at least possible for Congress to 
see where its money goes.  That’s not true for tax code goodies.  By law, 
IRS auditors are about the only people who might get a whiff of who’s 
claiming tax credits for solar energy production or low-income housing.  
And unless the IRS smells a rat, it is unlikely to ask questions that reveal 
fraud or abuse.  It might seem efficient to use the tax code to encourage 
social goals, and the economic effect of giving someone a tax break is 
little different from handing him a check. But the real question is who’s 
minding the store.132
Another reviewer recently testified to the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax 
Reform that “[m]any tax subsidies are complex, unfair, inefficient, non-transparent and 
127
 Although, as budget gimmicks many recent tax changes have been enacted with their 
own repeals in order to make the change artificially appear to be inexpensive. See Garrett, 
supra note 8, at 402-04.
128 See Cranford, supra note 56, at 814 (Tax spending “is a gift that just keeps on 
giving.”).




 Cranford, supra note 56, at 814.  
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corrupting…. [There is] almost no monitoring for effectiveness for almost all 
subsidies.”133  Without periodic budget review, oversight and public airing, such 
spending is likely to continue to be so.
“Type of Money” Effects:   Tax Spending is of Uneven Benefit134
Many discretionary and mandatory spending provide eligible beneficiaries with 
roughly equivalent value, regardless of the beneficiaries’ current economic status;135
others provide value in inverse relation to the beneficiaries’ status, helping lower income 
people more.136  Most tax spending does neither.  
Tax spending comes in many varieties—deductions, credits, exemptions, 
adjustments, etc.137  But virtually all of them are valuable to a taxpayer only in proportion 
to the amount of tax s/he would otherwise owe, A deduction (i.e., an exclusion from 
income counted for taxation) generally saves someone in the 10% bracket only 10% of 
the cost of the deductible spending, while someone in the 35% bracket saves 35%.  A 
credit (i.e., a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax liability) saves someone who owes $1,000 
in tax a maximum of $1,000, whereas someone who owes $10,000 in tax may save up to 
$10,000.  Only a refundable credit (i.e., a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax liability in 
which the government pays the taxpayer if the credit exceeds liability, such as the Earned 
Income Tax Credit) comes close to being relatively equal in value across groups,138 but 
refundable credits are few and far between and increasingly under attack.139
133 Tax Reform and Fairness for Families, supra note 67, at 2, 19.
134 Cf. Surrey, supra note 59, at 720-725.  
135
 E.g. Medicare, general disease prevention and control activities.
136
 E.g., Medicaid, Community Health Centers for low-income people.
137
 See sources cited supra note 64 for extensive lists.
138
 Although even refundable credits “are limited to people with positive earnings … [and] 
largely exclude both the nonworking poor and many working poor without children; these groups will 
continue to depend on direct spending programs for assistance.”  URBAN INST., SOCIAL 
POLICY AND THE TAX SYSTEM 5 (2001), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310418_TaxSystem.pdf.  Moreover, even 
refundable credits for favored activities or purchase require that the taxpayers have the 
cash flow to pay the costs up front and wait for the refund.  Id.
139 See SHARON PARROTT ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, HOUSE 
BUDGET RESOLUTION WOULD REQUIRE MUCH DEEPER CUTS IN KEY LOW-INCOME 
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 The beneficiaries of tax spending are, thus, disproportionately affluent and, the 
more affluent they are, the more they benefit.  For example, using data from the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, it can be calculated that of persons filing taxes in 2004, 5% of 
those with incomes under $10,000 will claim a mortgage interest deduction, 41% of those 
with incomes between $50,000 and $75,000, and 76% of those with incomes between 
$100,000 and $200,000.  The average value of that deduction can be calculated to be 
$154 for the first group, $957 for the second group, and $2,603 for the third group.  (See 
chart.)140 The total spending through the mortgage interest deduction is estimated to be 
$70 billion in 2004.  Of that, 66% is expected to go to taxpayers with income over 
$100,000, a group that makes up 12% of those who file tax returns.141
PROGRAMS THAN SENATE BUDGET PLAN 2 (2005), at http://www.cbpp.org/3-30-
05bud.pdf: 
The House Budget Resolution would require the House Ways and Means 
Committee to cut $18.7 billion from programs under its jurisdiction.
When asked how the Budget Committee assumed the Ways and Means 
Committee would achieve this cut, Budget Committee Chairman Jim 
Nussle mentioned only one program: the EITC, a refundable tax credit that 
provides tax relief and wage supplements to low-income working families. 
Id.; cf. Brian Riedl, The Top 10 Examples of Government Waste, BACKGROUNDER 6 (The 
Heritage Found., No. 1840, 2005), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.c
fm&PageID=76437.  
140 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 64, at 41 tbl.2 (listing 
numbers of returns by income class); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 
CORRECTION OF ERROR IN TABLE 3 OF JCS-1-05, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005-2009, JCX-13-05 at 6 (2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-13-05.pdf (listing total dollar amounts of deductions by 
income class).  The calculation of percentages and values are my own.
141 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra notes 64, 155.
















































This is a counterintuitive income re-distribution program or “an ‘upside-down’ 
subsidy.”142 Tax spending gives government money to a person in a manner “little 
different from handing him/her a check,”143 but in direct proportion to the income s/he 
already has.144  An affirmative spending program of this type “would be laughed out of 
Congress,”145 but as opaque tax spending it and many like it continue.
Indeed, recent proposals have been made to carry out more government programs 
through tax spending.  The President has suggested using tax expenditures to encourage 
saving for health care costs,146 to subsidize long-term care insurance premiums,147 to aid 
with education expenses,148 and to assist with retirement investments.149  These proposals 
142
 Thuronyi, supra note 59, at 1159.
143
 Cranford, supra note 56, at 814.
144 Cf. Billie Holiday & Arthur Herzog Jr., God Bless the Child, on GOD BLESS THE 
CHILD (Columbia Records 1936) (“Them that’s got shall get/Them that’s not shall lose 
… .”). 
145
 Surrey, supra note 59, at 722.
146 OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 65, at 283-84, 296 tbl.17.3 (estimating 
that in 2006, providing a refundable tax credit for contributions of small employers to 
employee HSAs will result in $61 million cost).
147 EDWIN PARK, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET 
INCLUDES ADDITIONAL HEALTH TAX CUTS THAT PRIMARILY BENEFIT HIGHER-INCOME 
INDIVIDUALS 1 (2002), at http://www.cbpp.org/2-5-02health.pdf.
148 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, PRESIDENT BUSH’S 2001 TAX RELIEF SOFTENS THE 
RECESSION 2 (2002), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/TaxReliefActUpdate_Feb02wp.pdf.
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are not for refundable credits, so they will likely be skewed in their distribution in a 
manner similar to other such measures.   
The budget process has already facilitated this.  Tax increases require a 
supermajority in the House of Representatives,150 but tax cuts require only a simple 
majority and (as discussed below) are, if they are included in budget legislation, protected 
from filibuster in the Senate. New budget processes may facilitate this even more.151  The 
House and the Senate have each passed changes in rules that would exempt future tax cut 
legislation from PAYGO requirements.  This would structurally encourage vastly more 
policy to be conducted through tax spending.  If done through any means but refundable 
tax credits, such measures will likely be distorted in their distribution of assistance.
Timing Effects
Intrinsically, any budget is for a defined period of time.  The most common 
Federal budget is for a Federal fiscal year, running from October 1 to September 30.152
149 Id.
150
 Rules of the House of Representatives, 109th Cong., Rule XXI, cl. 5(b) (2005) (“A 
bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a Federal income tax 
rate increase may not be considered as passed or agreed to unless so determined by a vote 
of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting, a quorum being present.”).  The 
Senate has no such rule.  McGinnis & Rappaport argue that a supermajority requirement 
to raise taxes is good policy because it “functions as a modest precommitment by the 
majority not to go down a road that will make everyone worse off in the end as a 
concentrated interest groups demand expenditures that beggar the nation as a whole.”  
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 93, at 510.  While this public-choice argument is 
understandable when dealing with general taxes and affirmative spending, it refutes itself 
when dealing with tax expenditures, inasmuch as it is the interest group that benefits by 
the special tax treatment leaving the nation as a whole to take up the slack.
151
 H. Con Res. 95 (2005).
152
 The development of a budget, however, may span two or more calendar years. 
Agencies typically begin development of their proposals eighteen months before the 
beginning of the fiscal year.  The President edits and combines these proposals and 
submits his proposed budget eight months before the beginning of the fiscal year.  The 
Congress deliberates on the budget over the next eight months and, if successful, enacts 
spending measures by Sept. 30 for the fiscal year that commences Oct. 1.  Following the 
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For purposes of scorekeeping and PAYGO limits, however, the Budget Act requires the 
projection of budgetary effects of proposed legislation be over a five-year snapshot.
Such short time frames are not demanded by the moral claims of the public-
choice underpinnings of the policy.  One could budget for much longer than five years 
without creating an intergenerational transfer.  Such budgets would be, for all practical 
purposes, imposing the costs of a policy on the beneficiaries of it.153
Rather, the time frames are so limited because forecasting is a science of frequent 
doubts and occasional chaos.  Scorekeepers and other actuaries have noted discomfort 
with extended projections.  Uncertainty inevitably rises with each year added to a 
snapshot.154  For a very dramatic instance, one need only compare the projections for 
revenues made in 2000 with those made in 2002;155 less volatile changes occur regularly.  
But the length of this snapshot can make a crucial difference in lawmaking.  The 
shorter the snapshot, the lower the chance of enacting long-term investments.  A snapshot 
of five years may, for instance, fail to recognize offsetting benefits of investments in the 
longer run.
close of the fiscal year, it may take as much as another full year (much longer for 
mandatory spending programs) to account for the spending and close the books.  
153
 Some purists, though, insist on a moral claim of virtual instantaneous assignment of 
costs.
154 See Hearing on the Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-2013 Before 
Senate Comm. On the Budget (2003) (statement of Barry B. Anderson, Acting Director, 
Cong. Budget Office), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4031&sequence=0; Hearing on the Budget and 
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2003-2012 Before Senate Comm. on the Budget fig. 1 
(2002) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Director, Cong. Budget Office), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~budget/republican/about/hearing2002/crippenjan23.pdf; see also
Press Briefing on the Budget, Mitch Daniels, Director, Office of Mgmt. and Budget (Feb. 
3, 2003), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/speeches/daniels_04budget.html.
155 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-
2011, CHAPTER FIVE: THE UNCERTAINTY OF BUDGET PROJECTIONS, available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2727&sequence=6 (Jan. 2001).
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This simple problem has, in fact, been the major hurdle for delivering medically 
appropriate care for people with HIV under the Medicaid program.156  Medicaid 
eligibility is limited to very-low-income individuals who also fit into one or more 
categories.  The major categories are families with dependent children, people over the 
age of 65, and people who are totally disabled.157  Childless adults under the age of 65 
who are not disabled are generally not eligible for Medicaid.  From the outset of the 
AIDS epidemic, most people with AIDS have gained eligibility for Medicaid have done 
so by meeting the criteria of being totally disabled.158
Since 1988, however, a number of drugs have been licensed that slow the onset of 
disability among people infected with HIV and, beginning in 1995, a new series of drugs 
has been approved that seem to prevent the progression from infection to total disability 
altogether, at least for a substantial length of time for a substantial number of people.  But 
the Catch-22 of Medicaid eligibility means that people with HIV cannot be admitted (and 
have their medications paid for) until after they become disabled, i.e., after the new drugs 
have lost a substantial amount of their potential value to the patients’ health.
Since 1990, legislation has been introduced regularly in the Congress to amend 
the Medicaid statute to address this problem.  But in each Congress, the legislation has 
encountered fatal PAYGO problems.  Estimation of the probable time for progression 
from HIV infection to AIDS requires a complex epidemiological model, but most 
untreated infected people do not become disabled within the first five years.  Thus, the 
provision of health-preserving pharmaceuticals produces few offsetting savings of 
foregone hospital costs within the snapshot period.  Scorekeepers project that the costs of 
156
 For a full discussion of this issue, see TIMOTHY M. WESTMORELAND, MEDICAID AND 
HIV/AIDS POLICY: A BASIC PRIMER, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., 109-11, 
(1999) available at www.nastad.org/PublicPolicyResources/1891-KFF.pdf.
157
 Note that the Social Security Act definition (as contrasted with the Americans with 
Disabilities Act definition) of “disabled” is “unable to maintain substantial gainful 
activity,” i.e., unable to work.  Medicaid relies upon this definition also. Compare 42 
U.S.C. § 423(d) (definition of disability under the Social Security Act) with 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2) (definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
158 WESTMORELAND, supra note 154, at 109.
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the drugs would be incurred from the first day of implementation of the proposal but that 
offsetting savings in foregone hospital stays would not accrue until the sixth year.159
Other models project, however, that by the eleventh year, the savings of the legislation 
would be more than its cost over the entire period.160
Were the natural history of HIV/AIDS more accelerated, the legislation would 
meet the PAYGO requirements and likely would have been enacted.  Instead, a 
substantial number of childless adults with HIV remain ineligible for Medicaid and 
altogether uninsured.161
Similar snapshot conundrums can be found throughout Medicaid and Medicare 
and throughout the budget.162  Within the context of PAYGO, shorter snapshots produce 
a need for more immediate returns on spending.  This tacit procedural bias discourages 
long-term investments and may direct government spending to areas that are, in fact, less 
productive.163
159
 CBO score cite (NOTE: still working on this).   UCSF models.
160
 James C. Kahn et al., Health and Federal Budgetary Effects of Increasing Access to 
Antiretroviral Medications for HIV by Expanding Medicaid, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1464 (2001), available at WL 00900036 (UCSF models).
161
 Programs of discretionary spending have been created to provide HIV care to people 
without other sources of payment, but these programs have run out of funds in some 
States and some have standing waiting lists for prescription drugs. Recent reports, 
however, show that increased drug prices and limited State and Federal support for such 
programs have led to shortfalls in many States.  See Kaiser Family Found., supra note 70.
162 Cf. Judith A. Johnson, Mammography Quality Standards Act: Background and Issues, 
Cong. Research Serv. (Oct. 22, 1998) (explaining that Medicare did not provide for 
mammography screenings); Robert J. Clark, Individuals With Disabilities Education Act 
(May 2005) (unpublished research paper on file with author) (explaining that there are no 
savings estimated from an attempt to make education for children with disabilities 
mandatory spending). It is interesting to note that both the Social Security program and 
the Medicare program employ seventy-five year forecasts for estimating the solvency of 
their trust funds, although they do so with a long list of disclaimers about uncertainty and 
possible changes.
163
 There is an increasingly common practice of drafting legislation with a slow phase-in 
or an artificial termination of a statutory provision (e.g., tax reductions) within a snapshot 
period in order to reduce its score.  This is, in some ways, the obverse of the timing 
problem discussed here, but I do not believe it is a true structural problem because it 
could be remedied by making the provision coterminous with the snapshot, requiring 
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Solipsism Effects
While many theories of the role of government concentrate on the common good, 
the compensation for market failures, or redistribution of wealth and opportunity, the 
budget process directs Federal focus inward, resulting in an under-appreciation of public 
value and public improvement.  The baseline, scorekeeping, and PAYGO structure all 
focus on the net cost of an activity to the Federal fisc and place no value on non-Federal 
savings.164
For example, a Congressional initiative to use mandatory spending to provide a 
new vaccine against the newly arising pandemic avian influenza would be scored for its 
purchase price times the number of eligible and willing recipients, both projected over 
five years.  Every dose provided with Federal funds would be designated as a cost.  But 
the offsetting savings of foregone hospital costs would be taken into account only to the 
extent that the Federal government would have been liable for mandatory payment of 
such costs.  Thus, savings from prevented illnesses of beneficiaries of the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs would count.165 Savings from prevented illnesses of the public at 
large—whether privately insured or uninsured—would not count.  The even more widely 
dispersed benefits of preventing an epidemic would also remain unscored. 166
reauthorization. Rather, this practice is one of many gimmicks and, as mentioned above, 
will not be discussed in this paper.  For a discussion of such timing gimmicks, see 
Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax 
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998).
164
 By contrast, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act requires evaluation by the CBO of 
costs imposed upon State and local government and the private sector. See Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 104 Pub. L. No. 4 § 202, 109 Stat. 48, 64 (1995).
165
 Savings for veterans and for federal employees would not count toward PAYGO 
because those programs are funded with discretionary spending.  The operating 
assumption is that all discretionary savings will be spent on other purposes.
166
 An important and largely unexplored corollary of such scorekeeping is that it would 
be possible to accrue mandatory spending savings or costs for regulatory legislation that 
does not itself directly authorize the spending of Federal money.  For instance, extension 
of FDA market protections of brand-name drugs against generic competition has been 
scored as an increase in mandatory spending because of its effects on Federal mandatory 
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This sealed system is perhaps an accurate reflection of the budget itself.  The 
prevention of an epidemic among people without a claim on Federal health care is a 
matter of no significance to the Federal accounting.  But this fiscal solipsism skews 
legislative action away from interventions of general application that may be the most 
productive government investment.  
It takes little imagination to expand on this avian flu example to develop the likely 
political and legislative response to this PAYGO problem.  To contain the score, a 
proponent of legislation would move toward providing the vaccine only to those persons 
whose hospital bills would be a Federal responsibility.  Even if the screening and 
eligibility process for finding these persons were only marginally less costly—and vastly 
less helpful—than general distribution of the vaccine to the public, no budgetary 
incentive exists to purchase broadly or to prevent epidemics generally.  
In a more abstract manner, some combination of history and this problem has 
produced exactly such a skewed approach when it comes to Federal funding for public 
health (or population-based) services as contrasted with insurance (or individual 
treatment) services.  Virtually all Federal support of public health is from discretionary 
spending.  By contrast, a great majority of insured health care provided by the Federal 
government is from mandatory spending.  In general, public health programs predate the 
insurance programs, but that tradition has kept them in less advantageous funding 
streams.167
spending purchasers.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAY-AS-YOU-GO ESTIMATE: S. 1789, 
BEST PHARMACEUTICALS FOR CHILDREN ACT OF 2001 (2002), available at
http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/32xx/doc3271/s1789.pdf. The converse is also true: Regulatory 
legislation that requires non-Federal spending (e.g., the costs of extending the protection 
of brand-name drugs against generic competition that extends to all non-Federal 
purchasers) also goes unrecognized.
167
 There is also something of a pattern of providing mandatory spending only for 
programs that assist individuals (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, AFDC, 
veteran’s disability payments, etc.).  A study of the historical and legal intertwining of the 
concept of “individual entitlement” and mandatory spending would be illuminating.  But 
recent laws have provided mandatory spending to States rather than to individual 
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This results in some strange public policy.  At its acme, Federal support for 
fluoridation of water was $30 million per year,168 although the discrete program no longer 
exists, having been repealed in 1981.169  By contrast, Medicaid does pay for dentistry for 
children, and mandatory spending for that service exceeds $2 billion per year.170  The 
American Dental Association estimates that the lifetime cost of fluoridated water for one 
person is less than the cost of filling one cavity,171 but, like the hypothetical avian flu 
vaccine example, the savings to be accrued from the intervention would be counted only 
for Federal beneficiaries.  Equally paradoxically, just as the Federal government is 
recognizing that it spends billions on health problems associated with obesity and 
beneficiaries (e.g., TANF, CHIP), and proposals are being considered now to provide 
mandatory spending authority to the Secretary of HHS to make contracts with 
pharmaceutical companies (“Project Bioshield”). See generally OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT 
AND BUDGET, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/ (2004).
168 Cite from CDC funding history of Title 3 funding. (Note: still working on this)
169
 States can still choose to use discretionary funds from the Federal Preventive Health 
and Health Services Block Grant (Title XIX of the Pub. Health Serv. Act), but funding in 
that program is used for a wide range of activities, data are not gathered sufficient to 
determine the extent of fluoridation funding, and the purchasing power of that block grant 
has eroded dramatically over the last twenty years.  See 42 U.S.C. § 247b-14a (2005).  
Moreover, the President’s Budget for 2006 proposes that even this program also be 
repealed. See generally OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 
PROPOSAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/ (2005).
170
 Data are insufficient to determine how much of this spending would be preventable if 
water were universally fluoridated.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 
NATIONAL HEALTH ACCOUNTS: DEFINITIONS, SOURCES, AND METHODS USED IN NHE 
2003 tbl.1, http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/definitions-sources-methods/ (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2005).
171
 ADA’S FLUORIDATION FACTS, AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION (2002), 
available at http://www.ada.org/public/topics/fluoride/facts-cost.html#41.
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sedentary life styles,172 the President’s budget includes the elimination of the programs 
for in-school exercise and for a range of fitness activities.173
This problem of focus could, in theory, be addressed by following the benefits of 
any broad public intervention through the economy all the way back to Federal revenues.  
A publicly available avian flu vaccine, fluoridation program, or childhood exercise effort 
could, for instance, lower health care premiums for employer-based insurance and 
increase productivity in the workforce.  In turn, this could increase profits and payrolls, 
resulting in higher revenues for the Federal government from corporate and individual 
taxes.  
No scorekeepers have been willing to estimate such attenuated effects.  To the 
extent that they are uncomfortable estimating ten-year snapshots of direct costs and 
savings, they are even more uncomfortable estimating such revenue changes as a result of 
any but the most targeted legislation that links services to Federal beneficiaries’ costs.174
Acceptability Effects
172 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY: 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/economic_consequences.htm (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2005).
173
 John Briley, Does Bush Put His Budget Where His BMI Is?, WASH. POST, March 8, 
2005, at HE03.
174
 Note that partisan scorekeepers have made such extended estimates when projecting 
effects of tax legislation.  See Lawrence Whitman, Making the Tax Cuts Permanent and 
Fully Effective Now, The Heritage Found., 2002, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/BG1614.cfm. See also Daniel J. Mitchell, How 
to Measure the Revenue Impact of Changes in Tax Rates, The Heritage Found., 1996, 
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/BG1090.cfm.  Note also that some 
nongovernmental economists are now projecting the costs of private health insurance into 
the costs of produced goods and, therefore, competitiveness of U.S. industries.  For 
instance, General Motors has estimated that the costs of health insurance alone add 
$1,400 to the price of each car made in the U.S. See Peter Robison, GM Needs “Radical” 
Measures to Arrest Decline, Executives Say, BLOOMBERG.COM, March 21, 2005, 
available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aNgg4rudrSeY&refer=us.
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Cost analyses, especially in health policy, have a difficult bottom line:  It is 
almost always cheaper for very sick people to die.   This is basically true for analyses 
conducted for the Federal budget process as well.  
For example, early discussions of covering preventive services in Medicare 
explicitly discussed such issues.  At its inception, Medicare paid for no preventive care.  
Pneumonia was a widespread and frequently fatal illness among the elderly and disabled, 
especially those who were frail and those who were in nursing homes (and who, 
consequently, used many expensive services).  In the late Seventies, the licensure of a 
highly effective vaccine against pneumonia prompted legislation to expand Medicare’s 
coverage to include it.
This legislation was introduced at the time of the initial ascendancy of budget 
process in Congress,175 and analyses of the legislation were among the first 
comprehensive projections made of budget consequences.  One Congressional review 
described the issues to be considered in doing such studies and concluded, counter-
intuitively, that the vaccine would represent a net cost to the Medicare program of $4.40 
per beneficiary vaccinated, even after accounting for the savings from the medical costs 
that would not be incurred because pneumonia was prevented.  A major reason the 
proposal was estimated to have a cost was an explicit calculation of the “[c]ost of treating 
illnesses [other than pneumonia] not prevented by vaccination in extended years of 
life.”[Emphasis added.] 176  The study goes on to describe the reason for the “high figure 
in positive net costs” for the elderly and the even higher costs for other “high risk” groups 
of chronically ill or disabled persons:
[A] vaccination program becomes more costly, apparently because, as more
deaths are averted, the cost of medical care in extended years of life increases….  
Pneumococcal vaccination may or may not be cost-effective for those in high risk 
175
 Although this precedes the advent of the PAYGO of BEA and estimates were, 
therefore, for accounting and planning purposes and did not serve as procedural limits.
176
 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A REVIEW OF SELECTED 
FEDERAL VACCINE AND IMMUNIZATION POLICIES, OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, at 75 (1979).
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groups other than the elderly.  Although these groups would experience benefits 
from vaccination in reduced treatment costs for pneumococcal pneumonia and 
gains in life expectancy, these benefits might be offset by high costs for treatment 
of other illnesses and poor general health in extended years of life.177
A later analysis of the more general topic of the possible inclusion of a range of 
preventive services as covered benefits in Medicare distanced itself from the use of such 
calculations because, if appraised in this manner, a “highly effective preventive service 
could also fail the test of being cost-saving to Medicare if by prolonging life it induces 
future Medicare expenditures for unrelated illness….”178
The effect of increased costs to the Medicare program for extending the life of its 
beneficiaries (known as “survivors’ costs”179) is undoubtedly true in many cases.  If a 
vaccine changes the baseline of the number of people who are actuarially projected to die 
from pneumonia and if those people then receive other Medicare-covered benefits, the 
vaccine will increase spending.  Any projection used for assessing solvency of the 
Medicare Trust Fund or estimating the Federal deficit and debt should take this into 
account.180
177 Id. at 78-79.
178
 PREVENTIVE HEALTH SERVICES FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: 
POLICY AND RESEARCH ISSUES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, at 
12-13 (1990).
179 See e-mail from Jane Sisk, Professor of Health Policy
Director, Div. of Health Care Statistics, National Ctr. for Health Statistics, to Timothy M. 
Westmoreland, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (Feb. 8, 2005) (on 
file with author).
180
 Or, in contrast, some have argued that if an activity increases mortality it might be 
seen as a “savings” to some mandatory spending program. See John B. Shoven, Jeffrey 
O. Sundberg and John P. Bunker, The Social Security Cost of Smoking, NBER 
WORKING PAPER SERIES, Nat’l Bureau of Economic Research (May 1987), available 
at http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2023914998-5020.html#images.  See also W. KIP. 
VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 
(2002). I am unaware of anyone going so far as to propose that anti-smoking efforts be 
repealed in order to create such savings, either for deficit-reduction or as an offset for 
new spending.  But cf., Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The 
Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 1163 (1998) 
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But should health law take this into account?  Or, more accurately, should this be 
the threshold decision for enacting the law?  Few people are willing to face, much less 
defend, a scorekeeping policy that is predicated on budgetary euthanasia.  It is 
particularly troubling (although perhaps particularly accurate) when used in the context 
of programs to help elderly, disabled, and low-income people—the very people aided by 
most Federal mandatory spending.    
But, even as recently as the enactment of the new Medicare prescription drug 
coverage, some version of this method appears to have been used.  In describing why its 
model included costs but no savings from new access to pharmaceuticals, the CBO said, 
inter alia, “[T]o the extent that a drug benefit helps people live longer, they may consume 
more health care over their remaining lifetime than they would have without the 
benefit.”181   In other words, it is still cheaper for Medicare beneficiaries to die.
Euthanasia by budget is not the only actuarially accurate but publicly 
unacceptable outcome of scorekeeping rules.  These rules also encourage the thwarting of 
the public’s preferences for services—a sort of anti-market. 
Consider, for example, how the budget rules have ground to a halt a movement to 
provide health care for people with disabilities in settings other than nursing homes.182  A 
comparison of nursing-home care with home care generally shows that the relative costs 
per individual are, at worst, equal.183  But a proposal to expand Medicaid benefits to 
include community-care services in addition to nursing-home services is scored not just 
(arguing that, if such savings are an acceptable goal, a more efficient means to 
accomplish it exists, i.e., suicide contracts).
181 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT FOR 
MEDICARE (2002), available at http://cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3960&sequence=5.
182 See generally Medicaid Community-Based Attendant Services and Supports Act of 
2005, S. 401 and H.R. 910 (109th Cong.) (2005).
183 See, e.g., Karen E. Klein, Ask the Expert; Arranging Home Care, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 
2005, at B03 (stating that “Agency-provided home care averages $16 to $18 an hour, 
while Long Island's nursing home facilities in 2003 averaged $316 a day per patient, 
according to the New York State Partnership for Long Term Care”).
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for the per-person costs but also for the expected increase in the use of such services.  
Many people who would never consider a nursing home for themselves or their loved 
ones would readily use home care.  To a budget analyst, beneficiaries who are presently 
costing nothing for long-term care in institutions would “come out of the woodwork” to 
avail themselves of long-term care at home.  (This conundrum is, in fact, widely and 
unaffectionately known as the CBO “woodwork effect.”)184
So there is institutionalization by the budget.185  The legislation to expand home 
and community care has been introduced for a decade and never moved past hearings and 
scoring. 186  Legislators can feel confident that they can camouflage their decision to 
oppose or simply fail to support such legislation as simply “the budget,” without 
confronting the values implicit in that calculation.  
Other such actuarial/ethical conundrums can be easily posited.  The Federal move 
toward expanding care for premature infants undoubtedly kept a number of children with 
disabilities alive who would otherwise have died.  Many, if not most, of those children 
were automatically eligible for Medicaid and likely posed a significant cost to the 
184
 A version of the woodwork effect was also used by Medicaid officials as justification 
for continued institutionalization in arguments before the Supreme Court in a case about 
the Americans with Disabilities Act.  See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).   
185
 A less obvious, but closely related instance of statutory provisions driven by budget 
scorekeeping is Medicare’s limitation of the hospice benefit to people whose physicians 
certify that they are expected to live for no longer than six months.  See 42 U.S.C. § 139, 
5, x. There was concern that a large number of beneficiaries might choose the new 
hospice benefit as an alternative, and the six-months-to-live requirement was added to 
address these cost concerns. See e-mail from Michael M. Hash, former Deputy 
Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, to Timothy M. Westmoreland, 
Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (April 11, 2005) (on file with 
author).
186
 Indeed, court decisions that are otherwise rights-affirming have almost reified the 
budget to such a degree that actions that would require changes to it are deemed 
“fundamental alterations of the program” and thus beyond the reach of the law. See 527 
U.S. 581 (Olmstead’s discussion of when costs constitute a “reasonable accommodation” 
and when they are a “fundamental alteration” for purposes of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act). For a fuller discussion of per-person versus statewide costs,  Williams 
v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md. 2001). 
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program.  Should the legislation to establish these interventions have fallen on a 
parliamentary point of order that it was too expensive?  
Likewise, any legislation to require Medicare to cover implantable cardioverter 
defibrillators (ICDs, the device given to Vice President Cheney after his heart attack in 
2001) would probably have encountered a double whammy.  Unlike vaccines or prenatal 
care, the device is quite expensive on its own, but it is also apparently quite effective in 
preventing cardiac death, which should incur significant survivors’ costs in Medicare.  
Should this calculation be the basis for refusing to provide the coverage?187
These are the horns of the dilemma for the aim of the Congressional budget 
process:  an actuarial accounting of policy changes will, in some instances, produce 
results that no one supports.  Notably, under any budget pre-commitment, this accounting 
is used not just for forecasts and prognostication but also for budget enforcement and 
limitation of legislative options.  Today, a proposal to provide pneumococcal vaccination 
or expand prenatal care or cover ICDs would not make it past PAYGO—but for reasons 
that no Member of Congress would be willing to defend.  Had the recent Medicare Drug 
bill’s overall score been too high, the modeling decision to add offsetting costs because 
beneficiaries might live longer could have made for a troubling debate.
This result is in direct contravention of one of the Buchanan rules about an ideal 
budget-balancing structure.  “[M]ost importantly,” he argues, “the fiscal rule must reflect 
and express values held by the citizenry, for then adherence to the precepts of the rule 
may, to some extent, be regarded as sacrosanct.”188  It seems unlikely that the values 
hidden under the estimation of survivors’ costs and anti-markets are ones that the public 
would find appealing.  
187
 The Medicare coverage of ICDs did, in fact, dodge this bullet.  Once the device was 
judged non-experimental (four years after Mr. Cheney received it), it was automatically 
within the reach of the requirements for coverage of the existing Medicare statute.  Since 
PAYGO only applies to new Congressional action and not to Executive action, no offsets 
were required.
188 DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 183.
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Camouflage Effects
In arguing for a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution, Buchanan lays 
out other criteria for his ideal.  “First of all,” he says, “it must be relatively simple and 
straightforward, capable of being understood by members of the public. Highly 
sophisticated rules that might be fully understood only by an economists' priesthood can 
hardly qualify on this count alone.”189
He was likely aiming the sarcasm in the latter part of the comment at the 
Keynesian business-cycle deficit-spending rules and their ilk.  But the same criticism can 
be applied to the tools needed to enforce all the ostensibly “simple and straightforward” 
pre-commitment devices in either a Constitutional amendment or in the statutory 
alternatives.  The general goals about deficits may seem clear to the public.  But rather 
than making the subsidiary but nonetheless major choices clear to the public, these 
devices and tools hide their principles in footnotes and assumptions.  They camouflage 
political decisions that would be unsupportable in public.   No one would return to his/her 
constituents to say that s/he has voted against legislation so as to ensure that Medicare 
beneficiaries continue to die according to the actuarial assumptions used in the baseline.  
But many return regularly to say that s/he has opposed legislation because it would “bust 
the budget,” without further explanation. Given the intricacies of the process, the 
variability of its necessary assumptions, and the structural problems implicit in it, the 
budget rules conceal from voters a multitude of sins—both of omission and commission.  
Most basically, this camouflage undermines transparency and representation.  
Few of the staff, fewer of the Members, and virtually none of the voters comprehend the 
“sophisticated rules that might be fully understood only by an economists' priesthood.”  
When compounded with the parliamentary procedure and supermajorities necessary to 
bypass these rules, they insulate political decisions from any but the most general 
accountability.  This insulation, in turn, concentrates influence in those groups that have 
189 Cf. Garrett, supra at 406 (suggesting that a newly designed budget process should “not 
obscure allocative decisions from the view of the electorate”).  
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the wherewithal to dissect the various assumptions, find the available offsets, and 
maneuver within the process.190  To that extent, the process exacerbates the very 
problems of interest-group influences that public-choice theorists have also identified.191
The Budget Primacy Effect
The most basic effect presented by the budget process is also its fundamental 
premise and the motivation behind all of the structures of GRH, BEA, and new proposals:  
Budgets matter most.  Over and above the Solipsism Effect in which only Federal costs 
and savings are counted, even in the Federal solipsistic cosmology, budgets count more 
than anything else.  
Most basically, the budget process has been and remains one of the main agenda 
setters for the Congress.  Ever since the Budget Act of 1974, the Congress has committed 
itself to a schedule that guarantees that the budget will be given attention at least once a 
year and often more, whether the Members and their Leadership want to or not.  Other 
substantive legislation, such as health laws, civil rights laws, and environmental laws, are 
not guaranteed floor time and, indeed, their proponents must compete vigorously to get to 
the head of the queue.192  This structural pre-commitment to the budget ensures that 
debates about deficit-spending will have an ongoing review above all other topics.
Moreover, a significant rules change in the Senate has effectively made the 
budget even more of an agenda-driver than even its guaranteed annual consideration did.  
In 1974, the Senate chose to make the budget resolution and the concomitant budget 
190 Id. at 445 (“[T]his process, just like any other, can be made so complicated that only 
budget process groupies will be able to understand congressional deliberations, allowing 
experts to manipulate the rules to achieve ends far removed from those that would result 
from more straightforward deliberation…. [A] structure for conflict that masks the 
underlying realities of political decisions is inconsistent with democratic accountability”).
191 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, ch. 19 (1965).
192
 Note that this is different from the longstanding structure of annual appropriations 
legislation, which also ensures a place in the schedule for discretionary spending.
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legislation package193 invulnerable to filibuster and subject to a simple majority vote.194
As such, the budget measures are among the only pieces of legislation that can be passed 
over the objections of 49 Senators.  In turn, the incentive is in place to make the budget 
carry any freight that has significant opposition.  For instance, virtually all tax measures, 
which are usually controversial to at least one Senator, are done in the context of the 
budget legislation.  In 2005, even controversial legislation to allow oil drilling in the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge was attached to the budget (ostensibly because of the 
revenue effect of user fees) and, was, thus, invulnerable to filibuster.195  This delay-proof 
status for passage of the budget is reinforced by the supermajority required to bypass the 
budget process in the Senate.  It ensures that the budget will continue to be the spine of 
the Congressional agenda for the legislative year.  
More fundamentally, fiscal impact has become the only universal criterion 
applied to all legislation.196  Because this measure is applied as a threshold criterion for 
entry to the House or Senate floors, it also has come to be an on/off switch for any 
legislative activity.  Under the budget rules, legislation with a net score of zero can 
proceed; legislation with a net score greater than zero usually cannot.  This structure 
effectively designates the baseline as the high-water mark of law and any upward change 
to the baseline as suspect.
193
 I.e., The “Budget Reconciliation” legislation that makes amendments in substantive 
statutes (such as the Medicare or the Internal Revenue Code) that will lower (or 
sometimes raise) spending and revenues so that they match the totals in the budget 
resolution for the year.
194 See e-mail from Robert Dove, former Senate Parliamentarian, to Timothy M. 
Westmoreland, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (April 8, 2005) 
(on file with author). There are few other issues in the Senate that are filibuster-proof.  
The War Powers Act is another.  Current consideration is being given to making judicial 
nominees filibuster-proof as well.  
195
 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Supports Arctic Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2005, at 
1.  The drilling proposal, however, was ultimately removed from the budget package 
because it proved so controversial that it endangered passage of the legislation in the 
House. 
196
 Other measures are nominally applied to legislation also, such as the Inflation Impact 
statement and the Unfunded Mandates review, but none has the reach or the force of the 
budget rules.
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Such budget primacy is too short-sighted, especially when it is carried out in the 
name of protecting future generations.  Not all spending is valueless consumption.  Some 
spending adds value that is as transferable to our successors as is a government surplus.  
Immunization, fluoridation, lead-abatement—virtually all public health measures pass on 
intergenerational benefits.  Investments in prenatal care improve the health of children.  
Lowering the rates of HIV infection would improve lives far beyond a five-year snapshot.  
Helping people with disabilities live in their communities rather than in institutions 
improves their personal lot and arguably adds back to the communities, too.  
Incrementally lengthening the lives of elderly people may, indeed, add to the costs of 
Medicare, but all signs are that a widely accepted value exists to doing so.
With creative economics, perhaps some of these improvements could be 
monetized as thoroughly as their costs.  Many cannot.  Even those that can do not fare 
well within the short-focused, solipsistic strictures of the budget processes most recently 
employed in the Congress.  
These benefits are as appropriate a goal for government as deficit-containment.  
But the budget structures do not improve the chance that the Congress will adopt them; 
indeed, they make enactment more difficult.
Part Four:  Counterbalancing the Budget
As the Congress moves to revive and revise its budget rules, it should deal with 
the ways that they distort substantive legislation.  This goal seems unlikely at this point, 
inasmuch as the Congress has recently debated measures that would create more 
distortions, not fewer.197
But at a minimum, the budget process should be re-tooled to allow the routine and 
transparent recognition of benefits as well as costs.  Structural processes should also 
197 See supra pp. 32-56.
Draft:  Do Not Quote, Cite, or Distribute
59
assure that legislation does not make quantifiable non-economic factors worse.  By doing 
so, the effects of actuarial acceptability and camouflage may be mitigated and the 
complexity of the political debate may be revealed.  Rather than blocking all requests 
from consideration, the Congress should have a navigational tool that allows it to choose
among them and to make clear the consequences of its choices.  
Putting the Money where the Promise Is
Classifications of programs as discretionary or mandatory spending should be 
made more rational.  If a clear promise is made in law, it should be financed with 
mandatory spending.  Failure to do so can result in promises that are incrementally 
broken by time and politics.  The erosion of the purchasing power of the Indian Health 
Service programs is a clear example.
But there are other examples.  At a minimum, those Federal activities that are 
guaranteed by the Constitution should be equally guaranteed by the budget.  Health care 
for Federal prisoners, the protection of Federal voting rights, and the provision of counsel 
for defendants in Federal criminal actions—all are compromised if Congress fails to 
provide adequate funding.  While suits can be brought and courts can order that the 
Constitutional promise be fulfilled, litigation is an unreliable, uneven, and inefficient 
means of ensuring such guarantees.  
Likewise, if a Federal statute provides a pledge of Federal actions, the funding to 
provide them should not be contingent on annual appropriations.  If, for example, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act explicitly requires that certain Federal facilities be 
accessible, the funding to make them accessible should be considered mandatory.  
Making a statutory assurance into a two-step process that requires enactment and then 
separate appropriations is disingenuous; making it into a multi-step process that requires 
annual appropriations is effectively allowing the assurance to wither away.
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Discretionary spending could continue under such a re-ordered system.  Those 
laws that simply provide permission for the appropriations committee to provide funds 
would have no different status than they do now.  But the division between what is 
promised and what is permitted would be more honest and more clear.
Scorekeeping Health and Disability
Under current process, all legislation is uniformly examined solely through the 
one-dimensional view of a cost in dollars.  Other dimensions should be reviewed as well. 
Among health care researchers, the most commonly employed indices of public 
health status and the value of an intervention are morbidity (i.e., the relative incidence of 
getting sick) and mortality (the relative incidence of dying).198  A calculation of the 
effects that proposed legislation would have on morbidity and mortality could be readily 
done by a Congressional agency analogous to the CBO.199  Thus, if a proposal were made 
to increase Medicaid spending for child health, nonpartisan scorekeepers could project 
not just its financial costs during the snapshot but also its effects on morbidity and 
mortality.  The Congress would then have a view of both economic costs and non-
economic benefits and could make decisions as a prudent purchaser.  
But just as economics has multiple measures, health and public health have also 
moved beyond such simple calculations as morbidity and mortality.  A useful literature 
has arisen on scales of Years of Potential Life Lost (YPLLs) and Quality-Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYs), measures that are in widespread use in health policy—both domestically 
and internationally.200  These measures estimate, respectively, the marginal extension of 
198
 See generally the periodical titled Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reporter published 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ (last visited June 6, 2005).
199
 Some may say that such a projection would be speculative, but it certainly is no more 
so than current forecasts of baselines.  
200 Cf. MICHAEL F. DRUMMOND ET AL., METHODS FOR THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF 
HEALTH PROGRAMMES (2d. ed. 1997); COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE
(Marthe R. Gold et al. eds., 1996);  Donald L. Patrick, Assessing Health-Related Quality 
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life (i.e., showing that an intervention to save the life of a healthy three-year-old may 
return more to society than an intervention to save the life of a terminally ill 90-year-old) 
and the marginal improvement of life (i.e., showing that an intervention to extend 
functional abilities may return more to society than an intervention to prolong ventilator-
dependence).  Projection of the effects of legislation on these scales would provide an 
even more nuanced view to aid legislators in orderly decision-making.201
Such analyses are not novel.  In the world of health services research, the 
transition from cost-minimization analysis and cost-benefit analysis (which compare only 
dollars spent to dollars saved) to cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-utility analysis 
(which compare dollars spent to health measures and extensions of life, respectively)202
has long ago occurred.  The remarkable fact is that the Congress that sets so much of the 
process in motion with its budget decisions has failed to recognize them.
This is not to say that the original Budget Act and BEA structures to lower deficit 
spending should be sidestepped altogether.  Rather, these additional steps toward 
improved information and transparency would inform them.  Even Buchanan 
acknowledges that the appropriate government action in some cases—particularly capital 
investment—is increased spending and increased debt or increased taxation.203  Inclusion 
of health measures and other indicia of the value of a public investment will aid in 
separating those cases from those of plain consumption and those of simple interest-
group influence.  
of Life Outcomes, in EFFECTIVENESS AND OUTCOMES IN HEALTH CARE 137 (Kim A. 
Heithoff & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990).
201
 I make no attempt here to describe additional indices for other areas of policy.  
Housing, education, and employment, among others, may have comparable standards of 
value.  For a wide range of measures (some of them surprising), see POSNER, supra note 
11, at 139, 148 (“Chapter 3: How to Evaluate the Catastrophic Risks and the Possible 
Responses to Them,” including the statement: “I think that the downside of extinction [of 
all life on Earth] does outweigh the upside of faster scientific progress.”).
202 DRUMMOND, supra note 207, at 2 tbl.1.1.
203 DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12.
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Often this added information will not be parallel to the budget numbers.  
Providing a vaccine may, indeed, cost more than letting people die of pneumonia.  
Keeping premature babies alive rather than letting nature take its unaided course may add 
to Federal spending.  Revealing such policy decisions to be complex is useful, useful both 
for politicians and for the public.  Camouflaging them makes for unaccountable policy.
  Such complementary information may also make the decisions more salient to 
the public.  Arcane debates about how legislation affects PAYGO and baselines may not 
generate interest or understanding among constituents.  Providing routine, reliable 
measures of how the same legislation decreases preventable disease or adds years of 
potential life may make these same constituents more attuned to the issues and give them 
meaning.204
PAYGO for Health and Disability
Replicating another pre-commitment structure could also help re-direct legislation 
toward investments of future value rather than purchases of simple current consumption.  
For instance, imagine a PAYGO device for health standards (rather than dollar standards) 
that would prohibit consideration of any legislation that adds morbidity or mortality or 
reduces YPLLs and QALYs.  Thus, if legislation to ease air pollution standards were 
204
 For a very vivid, if off-kilter, example, consider the debate discussed in Jonathan 
Weisman & Ceci Connolly, Schiavo Case Puts Face on Rising Medical Costs; GOP 
Leaders Try to Cut Spending as They Fight to Save One of Program’s Patients, WASH. 
POST, March 23, 2005, at A13.  Opponents of proposed Medicaid cuts noted that the 
Members of Congress who led the effort to provide Federal intervention in the Schiavo 
case also led efforts to cut Medicaid, the largest government program for people with 
disabilities.  In response, the spokesperson for the House Majority Leader commented, 
“The fact that they’re tying a life issue to the budget process just shows how 
disconnected the Democrats are to reality.”  Id.  I believe both sides were pursuing non 
sequiturs: Ms. Schiavo’s feeding tube was not removed because of a specific payment 
policy or Medicaid shortfall, but the statement that budget process has no bearing on “a 
life issue” is willfully ignorant.  I should also quickly point out that having additional 
health indicia would likely not make the Schiavo case itself any easier; QALYs and 
DALYs do not make such end-of-life decisions formulaic.  But the title of the article 
comes close to the point; such health forecast data put not a face but a meaning to rising 
medical costs.
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estimated to increase morbidity and mortality from cancer and asthma, it would have to 
be accompanied by legislation to provide offsetting benefits, say through increased 
childhood immunization.  Or, if a bill to reduce funding for lead-poisoning screening 
were scored as increasing developmental disabilities and thus reducing Quality-Adjusted 
Life Years, it would have to be coupled with a disability-reducing action, say better 
containment of toxic chemicals.  Such a health PAYGO would at least assure that new 
laws do not make the Nation’s future health worse, just as a budget PAYGO is meant to 
assure that new laws do not make the Nation’s future finances worse.
Moreover, such a shotgun marriage of causes may ameliorate some of the worst 
aspects of disparities in group influence in the political process.  Bluntly, not much more 
can be done to improve the health status of affluent white Americans as a cohort.  The 
large gains to be made are in remedying the disparities of health status in groups that are 
unable to represent themselves in politics adequately.  A requirement of health PAYGO 
would bring some powerful political forces to their aid to reinforce them.
For example, since the greatest improvements in years of potential life and 
reduction of disability generally occur when dealing with infant mortality,205 such a 
scenario could create interesting partners:  Automakers who want to lessen tailpipe 
emission standards might team up with child-health advocates who want improvement in 
prenatal care.  Moreover, since the greatest disparities in current health status (and thus 
the most room to improve under current technology) are among low-income groups and 
racial and ethnic minorities,206 such a no-net-deterioration structure might also result in 
205
 Quanhe Young et al., Trends and Patterns of Mortality Associated with Birth Defects 
and Genetic Diseases in the United States, 1979-1992: An Analysis of Multiple-Cause 
Mortality Data, 14 GENETIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 493, 494 (1997) (“In the United States, birth 
defects are the leading cause of infant mortality as well as the leading cause of years of 
potential life lost (YPLL) before age 65 years . . . .”), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/info/reports/files/print/trends.pdf (draft).
206 See UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN 
HEALTH CARE, (Brian Smedley et al. eds., 2003); Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al., Key Facts: 
Race, Ethnicity, and Medical Care (update) (Kaiser Family Foundation 2003), available 
at 
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reinforcement of programs that benefit these groups:  The coal-fired power plants that 
want to slow the reduction of mercury (which increases disability) might be corralled into 
a coalition with advocates of diabetes-screening (which reduces preventable disability, 
especially among black Americans) or with proponents of transforming Indian Health 
into mandatory spending.207  Such coalitions are counter-intuitive, perhaps, but no more 
so than those who have been forced under budget rules to support Federal auction of 
spectrum airwave rights in order to finance Medicaid.208
A Few Final Thoughts on Public Choice and Public Health209
In considering whether it was ever appropriate for there to be public deficit-
spending, Buchanan does allow for “a public expenditure [for] the construction of a 




 This could also result in a novel variation on the use of interest groups to generate 
information about Federal spending through competition for limited resources.  
Describing structures that use funding offset requirements, Garrett notes: 
As predators seek offsets, they generate information not only about their 
own programs but also about the programs they propose to repeal or scale 
back. … In this way, the conflict engendered by offset requirements 
produces information that lawmakers can use to make allocative decisions, 
along with the information generated by government agencies and experts.
Garrett, supra note 8, at 424.  In the case of a health PAYGO structure, the interest group 
would be prompted to investigate the value of the public health measure they are paired 
with and to seek new interventions that might improve health status.
208
 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66 §§ 6002, 13,600-44, 
107 Stat. 312, 387-97, 611-48 (1993).
209
 The same thoughts would apply to other policies that affect cost-effectiveness and 
cost-utility for future generations, such as toxic waste disposal.  Solum, for instance, 
raises troubling questions regarding “disastrous global warming” and “persistent 
plutonium.”  Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children's Children's Children: The Problems 
of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 166-67 (2001).  Posner also raises 
such issues in Catastrophe and extends them to scientific accidents, exhaustion of natural 
resources, and loss of biodiversity.  POSNER, supra note 11, at 21-91.
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benefits are expected to extend over many periods. A dam might be a good example 
here.”210  In that circumstance, he acknowledges that, 
“[i]f democratic decision making will not produce correct results when debt 
financing is made available for short-term public expenditure projects, the 
same must apply to tax financing when this is offered as the means for 
financing genuinely long-term projects. Individuals will, in this case, take 
account of the real cost of the expenditure which will be borne, primarily or 
exclusively, in the present. They will be forced to undergo genuine sacrifice 
of current enjoyments in order to meet the tax increases necessary to finance 
the proposed project. On the other hand, they will not estimate the future 
benefits of the project properly…. [B]y and large, individuals will 
underestimate both future benefits and future tax payments when they are 
called upon to make social decisions.”
Add to this an argument about the value of investing not just in dams but 
in human capital.211  Since health care and public health can be regarded as such 
an investment,212 this might be enough of an argument to convince public-choice 
theorists that paying for forward-looking public health programs—even with 
deficit-financing—is an acceptable endeavor.213
But I intend the argument for the inclusion of public health measures as pre-
commitment devices in Congressional process to be more fundamental than just a 
possible argument for investing in capital.  These measures deserve the same moral status 
as those against deficit-spending because the public-health argument runs parallel to the 
210 PUBLIC DEBT, supra note 112, at 126.  It is interesting to note that Buchanan says that 
his first theoretical breakthroughs about public choice came through his work on an 
advisory commission on the financing of highways.  Id. at xvii-xx.
211 Cf. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS




 Although admittedly this is an uphill battle, inasmuch as Buchanan hypothesizes that, 
“within the framework of currently accepted fiscal traditions and practices,” deficit-
financing was acceptable in only a few, non-recurring circumstances (such as building a 
school) and suggests that recurring circumstances (such as paying teachers’ salaries) 
should be financed by taxes.  PUBLIC DEBT, supra note 112, at 129.  But he limits himself 
to saying this is only a hypothesis and only within that framework, so the public health 
argument might be acceptable.
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classical-economic-cum-public- choice message:  It is unethical to burden future 
generations with the cost of current policy.  By failing to undertake health activities to 
reduce morbidity and mortality or to increase in QALYs and DALYs, we are passing on 
non-monetary burdens to future generations as surely as when we pass on our financial 
debt.  
These suggested structural additions may sometimes work at cross purposes with 
the simple deficit-reduction goals of GRH and BEA.  Advocates of the public-choice 
budget structures were generally clear that they were also working for lower-spending 
and smaller government, and these may not lead to those goals.
But if the underlying premise of the budget laws and of public choice theory is 
not simply small government but actually the more fundamental correction of a structural 
tendency in politics toward deficit-spending because of its easy transfer of 
intergenerational burdens, 214 these new additions would be quite complementary.  During 
political consideration, health-enhancing, disability-reducing, life-saving measures incur 
many of the very systemic disadvantages that public-choice theory has identified in fiscal 
policy:  The avoidance of difficult, expensive present action assigns the resulting costs 
and burdens to future citizens.  The improvement of future health and reduction of future 
disability are as much an appropriate goal for government as the reduction of future 
interest payments; the failure to make these improvements is as immoral, profligate, and 
irresponsible as consuming now and asking others to pay later.
To some degree, this is an elaborate restating of the proverb that “A stitch in time 
saves nine,” although the proverb is generally advising a single person that s/he will be 
personally better off if s/he invests in the stitch. With intergenerational and time changes 
that translates to “A stitch through time saves nine,” and saves them for the cohorts of 
future citizens who are unable to represent themselves today.  Even if the “nine” is 
discounted to its net present value, that is probably a good investment in most 
214 DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT, supra note 12; P UBLIC DEBT, supra note 112, at 119-20.
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circumstances, and if the “nine” is, in fact, “nine million” or even “nine billion” it is a 
very good investment indeed.
Conclusion
The Budget Act of 1974, as amended, has had a tremendous influence on a wide 
range of law and policy.  Laws have been stopped, started, and distorted to meet these 
rules.   Congress has also changed much of its basic method of lawmaking, creating a 
system that establishes numbers in advance and then retrofits policy to fit them. Small-
government budget conservatives215 created structures that were aimed at stopping the 
Congress before it could spend again.  But these restrictions are under- and over-
inclusive.  The Congress has blinded itself with budgets.  It has hidden much of its true 
deficit creation and intergenerational transfers of burden behind opaque special rules for 
taxes.  It walked away from some of its most basic promises, thwarted its ability to make 
long-term investments, or stopped itself from recognizing any value to the future except 
money.
Because of all these structural problems, the enforcement tools of the current 
budget process should be supplemented.  The problems intrinsic to the existing policy—
especially its camouflage of complex decisions as simple ones and its virtual dismissal of 
non-monetary values—call for change in the budget process and an enlargement of its 
field of vision.  If routine measurements are needed to aid policy, they should include 
both budgetary and non-budgetary projections.  If precommitment structures are needed 
to restrain the creation of fiscal deficits, they are needed to restrain the creation of non-
fiscal legacies as well.  Using new measures in health (and in other fields, to the extent 
215
 E.g., Senators Gramm and Rudman, and Budget Director Stockman.  The labels of 
“conservative” and “liberal,” however, are sometimes misleading in a budget context.  By 
many measures, both Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush could be accurately 
described as budget liberals, while President Bill Clinton might be described as a budget 
conservative.  See the discussion of “Developing a Measure of Fiscal Liberalism-
Conservatism” in David C. Barker, supra note 19, at 492-96.  I count myself as a large-
government budget conservative and have invited my few compatriots to join me in a 
group of “Liberals Against the Debt.” 
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that such measures exist), the Congress should attend to which spending is simple 
present-day consumption and which is an investment with value for the future.  It is not 
an easy course to steer, but it is the better one.
Oscar Wilde defined a cynic as “someone who knows the price of everything and 
the value of nothing.”216  The current budget process allows the Congress to be nothing 
but cynical.  With additional uniform information about value and a framework to 
encourage prudence, the process might allow for it to be more.  
216 OSCAR WILDE, Lady Windermere’s Fan, in THE PLAYS OF OSCAR WILDE 1, 61 
(Vintage Books 1988) (1892).
